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Coalitional games with veto players : myopic and rational behavior
Arin, Javier; Feltkamp, Vincent; Montero, María - 2012
This paper studies a noncooperative allocation procedure for coalitional games with veto players. The procedure is similar to the one presented by Dagan et al. (1997) for bankruptcy problems. According to it, a player, the proposer, makes a proposal that the remaining players must accept or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578191
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Common reasoning in games: a Lewisian analysis of common knowledge of rationality
Cubitt, Robin P.; Sugden, Robert - 2011
The game-theoretic assumption of "common knowledge of rationality" leads to paradoxes when rationality is represented … consistently incorporate any of a wide range of standards of decision-theoretic practical rationality. We investigate the … implications arising when the standard of decision-theoretic rationality so assumed is ICEU. -- Common reasoning ; common knowledge …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008933509
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Common reasoning in games : a resolution of the paradoxes of "common knowledge of rationality"
Cubitt, Robin P. (contributor); Sugden, Robert (contributor) - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003225834
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A violation of monotonicity in a noncooperative setting
Montero, María; Vidal-Puga, Juan J. - 2012
A power measure is monotone if a player with a larger weight is assigned at least as much power as a player with a smaller weight in the same weighted majority game. Failure of a power index to satisfy monotonicity is often considered a pathological feature. In this paper, we show that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009535529
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Promoting cooperation : the distribution of reward and punishment power
Nosenzo, Daniele; Sefton, Martin - 2012
Recent work in experimental economics on the effectiveness of rewards and punishments for promoting cooperation mainly examines decentralized incentive systems where all group members can reward and/or punish one another. Many self-organizing groups and societies, however, concentrate the power...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578208
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The value of vulnerability : the transformative capacity of risky trust
Bruni, Luigino; Tufano, Fabio - 2015
The "grammar of trust" is one the most explored loci in game theory and behavioural economics. However, still much needs to be understood about the nature of trust in non-enforceable, personalised interactions, in markets and within organizations. This experimental study aims at contributing to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011391585
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Endogenous information disclosure in experimental oligopolies
Kopányi, Dávid; Kopányi-Peuker, Anita - 2015
conduct a laboratory experiment where firms decide only about their production levels first, and the information they receive …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010530643
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Majoritarian contests with asymmetric battlefields : an experiment
Montero, María; Possajennikov, Alexandre; Sefton, Martin; … - 2013
choices from a laboratory experiment. The equilibrium predicts that the large battlefield receives more than a proportional …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010224988
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Entry or exit? : the effect of voluntary participation on cooperation
Nosenzo, Daniele; Tufano, Fabio - 2015
the effectiveness of these mechanisms in a one-shot public goods experiment. Voluntary participation has a positive effect …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011434271
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How do risk attitudes affect measured confidence?
Murad, Zahra; Sefton, Martin; Starmer, Chris - 2015
We examine the relationship between confidence in own absolute performance and risk attitudes using two confidence elicitation procedures: self-reported (non-incentivised) confidence and an incentivised procedure that elicits the certainty equivalent of a bet based on performance. The former...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011434351