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Explicit and implicit incentives and opportunities for mutually beneficial voluntary cooperation co-exist in many … crowding out of voluntary cooperation even after incentives have been abolished. This crowding out occurs also in repeated … voluntary cooperation while exposed to incentives. Overall, our findings show that the behavioral consequences of explicit …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014529308
cooperation. -- uncertain enforcement ; public good game ; altruistic punishment ; decisionmaking under uncertainty ; cooperation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003990188
pillar is internalised norms of cooperation, sustained by emotions such as guilt and shame. The second pillar is the … motivation can sustain cooperation if enough people cooperate but can jeopardise social order if many others follow selfish …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010257224
Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may affect the balance of power between the original members even if their number of votes and the decision rule remain constant. Some of the original members may actually gain, a phenomenon known as the paradox of new members. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003604082
We experimentally investigate a repeated "inspection game" where, in the stage game, an employee can either work or shirk and an employer simultaneously chooses to inspect or not inspect. Combined payoffs are maximized when the employee works and the employer does not inspect. However, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578200
Efficiency under contractual incompleteness often requires voluntary cooperation in situations where self … gift-exchange game of how explicit and implicit incentives affect cooperation. We first show that there is substantial … cooperation under non-incentive compatible contracts. Incentive-compatible contracts induce best-reply effort and crowd out any …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009153163
We experimentally investigate a repeated "inspection game" where, in the stage game, an employee can either work or shirk and an employer simultaneously chooses to inspect or not inspect. The unique equilibrium of the stage game is in mixed strategies with positive probabilities of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010340303
We experimentally investigate how reputational concerns affect behavior in repeated Tullock contests by comparing expenditures of participants interacting in fixed groups with the expenditures of participants interacting with randomly changing opponents. When participants receive full...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011456852
We examine the effectiveness of bonuses and fines in an "inspection game" where an employer can learn the effort of a worker through costly inspection. Standard game theoretic analysis predicts that fines discourage shirking, whereas bonuses encourage shirking. In contrast, ownpayoff effects...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008933797
We report experimental data from bargaining situations where bargainers can make proposals as often and whenever they want, and can communicate via written messages. We vary the set of feasible contracts, thereby allowing us to assess the focality of three properties of bargaining outcomes:...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011384455