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Promoting cooperation : the distribution of reward and punishment power
Nosenzo, Daniele; Sefton, Martin - 2012
Recent work in experimental economics on the effectiveness of rewards and punishments for promoting cooperation mainly examines decentralized incentive systems where all group members can reward and/or punish one another. Many self-organizing groups and societies, however, concentrate the power...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578208
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Combining "real effort" with induced effort costs : the ball-catching task
Gächter, Simon; Huang, Lingbo; Sefton, Martin - 2015
an experiment with piece-rate incentives we find that the comparative static and the point predictions on effort …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010530634
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Pay secrecy and effort provision
Nosenzo, Daniele - 2012
giftexchange game laboratory experiment where an employer is matched with two symmetric employees. We compare effort choices made …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009634321
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Inducing good behavior: bonuses versus fines in inspection games
Nosenzo, Daniele; Offerman, Theo; Sefton, Martin; Veen, … - 2010
encourage shirking. In contrast, ownpayoff effects suggest that both fines and bonuses discourage shirking. In an experiment we … Fines ; Quantal Response Equilibrium ; Impulse Balance Equilibrium ; Experiment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008933797
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Team incentives and leadership
Drouvelis, Michalis; Nosenzo, Daniele; Sefton, Martin - 2015
, and a hierarchical mechanism team output is allocated by a team leader. Our experiment examines these mechanisms in both …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010515808
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Bonus versus penalty : how robust are the effects of contract framing?
De Quidt, Jonathan; Fallucchi, Francesco; Kölle, Felix; … - 2016
We study the relative effectiveness of contracts that are framed either in terms of bonuses or penalties. In one set of treatments subjects know at the time of effort provision whether they have achieved the bonus / avoided the penalty. In another set of treatments subjects only learn the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011434361
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Gift exchange and workers' fairness concerns : when equality is unfair
Abeler, Johannes; Altmann, Steffen; Kube, Sebastian; … - 2009
contractual incompleteness. In our experiment, one principal is matched with two agents. The principal pays equal wages in one …. This is not caused by monetary incentives per se since under both wage schemes it is profit-maximizing for agents to exert …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003854042
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The effects of (incentivized) belief elicitation in public good experiments
Gächter, Simon (contributor); Renner, Elke (contributor) - 2006
distribution of beliefs as well as the relationship between contributions and beliefs are unaffected by incentives. Eliciting … so in the latter half of the experiment. This result contradicts Croson (2000). We discuss the implications of our … results for the design of experiments. -- Incentives ; beliefs ; experiments ; public goods …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003375964
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The impact of pay comparisons on effort behavior
Nosenzo, Daniele - 2010
This study uses a three-person gift-exchange game experiment to examine the impact of pay comparisons on effort …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003990157
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The effects of (incentivized) belief elicitation in public goods experiments
Gächter, Simon; Renner, Elke - 2010
) Do incentives increase belief accuracy? 2) Are there interaction effects of beliefs and decisions? We investigate these … beliefs are incentivized. The relationship between contributions and beliefs is slightly steeper under incentives. However, we … beliefs at all. We discuss the implications of our results for the design of public good experiments. -- Incentives ; beliefs …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003990218