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Efficiency versus equality in bargaining

Galeotti, Fabio; Montero, María; Poulsen, Anders - 2015

We report experimental data from bargaining situations where bargainers can make proposals as often and whenever they want, and can communicate via written messages. We vary the set of feasible contracts, thereby allowing us to assess the focality of three properties of bargaining outcomes:...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011384455

Legislative bargaining with heterogeneous disagreement values : theory and experiments

Miller, Luis; Montero, María; Vanberg, Christoph - 2015

negotiations. In that case, each player receives an exogenous `disagreement value'. We characterize the set of stationary subgame …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011434323

Inefficiency in private value bargaining with naive players : an experimental study

Possajennikov, Alexandre; Saran, Rene - 2018

The paper reports on an experiment on two-player double-auction bargaining with private values. We consider a setting … no equilibrium achieving full efficiency. In the experiment, we vary the proportion of naive traders by introducing … computerized players. We find that full efficiency is not achieved in the experiment with or without naive traders, and efficiency …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852503

Bargaining over an endogenous agenda

Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - 2012

We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is then implemented. We characterize the policies which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009535532

Coalitional games with veto players : myopic and rational behavior

Arin, Javier; Feltkamp, Vincent; Montero, María - 2012

This paper studies a noncooperative allocation procedure for coalitional games with veto players. The procedure is similar to the one presented by Dagan et al. (1997) for bankruptcy problems. According to it, a player, the proposer, makes a proposal that the remaining players must accept or...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578191

Bargaining in standing committees

Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - 2012

Committee voting has mostly been investigated from the perspective of the standard Baron-Ferejohn model of bargaining over the division of a pie, in which bargaining ends as soon as the committee reaches an agreement. In standing committees, however, existing agreements can be amended. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578203

Demand bargaining and proportional payoffs in legislatures

Montero, María (contributor); … - 2006

We study a majoritarian bargaining model in which the parties make payoff demands in decreasing order of voting weight. If the game is constant-sum and homogeneous, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium is such that the minimal winning coalition of the players who move first forms and payoffs...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003407857

Preventive wars

Abbink, Klaus; Dong, Lu; Huang, Lingbo - 2022

The rise of a new power may lead the dominant power to seek a preventive war. We study this scenario in an experimental two-stage bargaining game. In each stage, the rising power makes a bargaining offer and the declining power must choose whether to accept it or fight. Between the two stages,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012801942

Fair share and social efficiency : a mechanism in which peers decide on the payoff division

Dong, Lu; Falvey, Rodney E.; Luckraz, Shravan - 2016

achieved under this simple mechanism and, in a controlled laboratory experiment, we find that players use a proportional rule …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011515831

The formateurs role in government formation

Seidmann, Daniel J. (contributor); Winter, Eyal (contributor) - 2004 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002364866