Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 210
Cover Image
Efficiency versus equality in bargaining
Galeotti, Fabio; Montero, María; Poulsen, Anders - 2015
We report experimental data from bargaining situations where bargainers can make proposals as often and whenever they want, and can communicate via written messages. We vary the set of feasible contracts, thereby allowing us to assess the focality of three properties of bargaining outcomes:...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011384455
Cover Image
Inefficiency in private value bargaining with naive players : an experimental study
Possajennikov, Alexandre; Saran, Rene - 2018
The paper reports on an experiment on two-player double-auction bargaining with private values. We consider a setting … no equilibrium achieving full efficiency. In the experiment, we vary the proportion of naive traders by introducing … computerized players. We find that full efficiency is not achieved in the experiment with or without naive traders, and efficiency …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852503
Cover Image
Demand bargaining and proportional payoffs in legislatures
Montero, María (contributor);  … - 2006
We study a majoritarian bargaining model in which the parties make payoff demands in decreasing order of voting weight. If the game is constant-sum and homogeneous, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium is such that the minimal winning coalition of the players who move first forms and payoffs...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003407857
Cover Image
Bargaining in standing committees
Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - 2012
Committee voting has mostly been investigated from the perspective of the standard Baron-Ferejohn model of bargaining over the division of a pie, in which bargaining ends as soon as the committee reaches an agreement. In standing committees, however, existing agreements can be amended. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578203
Cover Image
Dynamic bargaining and external stability with veto players
Anesi, Vincent; Duggan, John - 2015
This note examines the structure of stationary bargaining equilibria in the nite framework of Anesi (2010). The main result establishes a tight connection between the set of equilibrium absorbing points and the von Neumann-Morgestern solutions: assuming that players are patient, that the voting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011284227
Cover Image
Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - 2012
We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is then implemented. We characterize the policies which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009535532
Cover Image
Preventive wars
Abbink, Klaus; Dong, Lu; Huang, Lingbo - 2022
The rise of a new power may lead the dominant power to seek a preventive war. We study this scenario in an experimental two-stage bargaining game. In each stage, the rising power makes a bargaining offer and the declining power must choose whether to accept it or fight. Between the two stages,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012801942
Cover Image
Legislative bargaining with heterogeneous disagreement values : theory and experiments
Miller, Luis; Montero, María; Vanberg, Christoph - 2015
negotiations. In that case, each player receives an exogenous `disagreement value'. We characterize the set of stationary subgame …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011434323
Cover Image
Proportional payoffs in majority games
Montero, María (contributor) - 2008
, negotiations in the coalition can break down, in which case a new coalition may be formed (reversible coalitions). Under the most …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003675312
Cover Image
A carrot and stick approach to agenda-setting
Dahm, Matthias; Glazer, Amihai - 2013
This paper models a legislature in which the same agenda setter serves for two periods, showing how he can exploit a legislature (completely) in the first period by promising future benefits to legislators who support him. In equilibrium, a large majority of legislators vote for the first-period...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198483