The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the foremost international body responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. Members vote on issues of global importance and consequently receive perks – election to the UNSC predicts, for instance, World Bank and IMF loans....

We develop a theoretical framework for equity in council voting games (CVGs). In a CVG, a fully representative voting body delegates decision-making to a subset of the members, as describes, e.g., the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Three equity concepts are proposed, ex-ante...

Twenty years of negotiations over reform of the United nations Security Council (UNSC) are yet to bear fruit. We use recent advances in the theory of a priori voting power to present a formal quantitative appraisal of the "structural reforms" contained within eleven current reform proposals, and...

We present a theoretical model postulating that the relationship between crime and governance is "hump-shaped" rather than linearly decreasing. State failure, anarchy and a lack of infrastructure are not conducive for the establishment of any business. This includes illegal businesses, as...

We analyze a mixed oligopoly with free entry by private firms. It is assumed that a state-owned enterprise (SOE) maximizes an increasing function of output, subject to a break-even constraint. We first show that, because of instability, the industry cannot contain more than one SOE. Then we...

We construct a simple model incorporating various urban labour market phenomena obtaining in developing economies. Our initial formulation assumes an integrated labour market and allows for entrepreneurship, self-employment and wage employment. We then introduce labour market segmentation. In...

An industry is modeled in which entrepreneurs, who are heterogeneous in ability, may produce formally or informally. It is shown how the formalinformal mix depends on the distribution of ability, product demand and various parameter values. The industry equilibrium is compared to one in which...

We model entry by entrepreneurs into new markets in developing economies with regulatory barriers in the form of licence fees and bureaucratic delay. Because laissez faire leads to ‘excessive’ entry, a licence fee can increase welfare by discouraging entry. However, in the presence of a...

We examine the interplay between limited public funds and renegotiation when a foreign firm invests in social infrastructure. It is found that the critical factor is how the finance constraint alters the threat point for the government in renegotiation. Through its effect on this threat point, a...

In an incomplete contract setting, we analyze the contracting out of public service provision, comparing the performance of for-profit and notfor-profit firms (NPs). Two institutional arrangements are considered, with control rights lying either with the firm (’PPP’) or the government...