Our aim is to analyze the effect of public subsidies on the development path of Italian small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Public subsidies to SMEs have been often used with the aim of favoring economic growth in less developed regions. The main theoretical arguments justifying this...

We study resource allocation under private information when the planner cannot prevent bilateral side trading between consumers and firms. Adverse selection and side trading severely restrict feasible trades, as each marginal quantity must be fairly priced given the consumer types who purchase...

In many environments, including credit and online markets, past records about participants are collected, published, and erased after some time. We study the effects of erasing past records on trade and welfare in a dynamic market where each seller's quality follows a Markov process and buyers...

We show that a necessary and sufficient condition for entry to be unprofitable in markets with adverse selection is that that no buyer type be willing to trade at a price above the expected unit cost of serving those types who are weakly more eager to trade than her. We provide two applications...

The procurement of an innovation involves motivating a research effort to generate a new idea and then implementing that idea efficiently. If research efforts are unverifiable and implementation costs are private information, a trade-off arises between the two objectives. The optimal mechanism...

In the healthcare sector, Selection (S), Moral Hazard (MH) and Supply Induced Demand (SID) are three very important phenomena affecting patients' behavior. Despite there exists a vast theoretical and empirical literature on these phenomena, so far, no contribution has been able to approach them...

We empirically investigate the effect of oversight on contract outcomes in public procurement. In particular, we stress a distinction between public and private oversight: the former is a set of bureaucratic checks enacted by contracting offices, while the latter is carried out by private...

We study a capital market in which multiple lenders sequentially attempt at financing a single borrower under moral hazard. We show that restricting lenders to post take-it-or-leave-it offers involves a severe loss of generality: none of the equilibrium outcomes arising in this scenario survives...

We consider multiple-principal multiple-agent games of incomplete information in which each agent can at most participate with one principal. In such contexts, we show that the restriction to direct truthful mechanisms involves a loss of generality, even if one only focuses on pure strategy...

Whilst a lot has been said about how to fight corruption at tender stage in public procurement, post-tender corruption is an issue that remains almost unexplored. In this paper, we make a step towards filling this gap, by studying the relationship between the quality of a country's institutions,...