We consider multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard: Principals compete through mechanisms in the presence of agents who take unobservable actions. In this context, we provide a rationale for restricting principals to make use of simple mechanisms, which correspond to direct...

We consider multiple-principal multiple-agent games of incomplete information in which each agent can at most participate with one principal. In such contexts, we show that the restriction to direct truthful mechanisms involves a loss of generality, even if one only focuses on pure strategy...

We study competing mechanism games in which principals simultaneously design contracts to deal with several agents. We show that principals can profit from privately communicating with agents by generating incomplete information in the continuation game they play. Specifically, we construct an...

We consider multiple-principal multiple-agent games of incomplete information. In this context, we identify a class of direct and incentive compatible mechanisms: each principal privately recommends to each agent to reveal her private information to the other principals, and each agent behaves...

We study competing-mechanism games under exclusive competition: principals first simultaneously post mechanisms, then agents simultaneously choose to participate and communicate with at most one principal. In this setting, which is common to competing-auction and competitive-search applications,...

We study games in which several principals design mechanisms in the presence of privately informed agents. Competition is exclusive: each type of each agent can participate with at most one principal and meaningfully communicate only with him. Economic models of exclusive competition restrict...

We study games in which several principals contract with several privately-informed agents. We show that enabling the principals to engage in contractible private disclosures { by sending private signals to the agents about how the mechanisms will respond to the agents' messages { can...

We set up an experimental coordination game among bank depositors à la Diamond and Dybvig (1983). We elicit subjects' financial literacy and study the impact of revealing this information on the coordination problem typical of this game with multiple equilibria. We find that when no information...

We define a standard optimization problem with quadratic objective function and provide a rigorous visual proof for its solution without using calculus. We then show that such standard problem is a building block for several economic models related to microeconomics, game theory and pricing...

We run a laboratory experiment to investigate how the size of the group affects coordination in a bank-run game played repeatedly by participants facing different fellow depositors. For comparability purposes, we keep the coordination tightness constant across different sizes. Participants...