We set up an experimental coordination game among bank depositors à la Diamond and Dybvig (1983). We elicit subjects' financial literacy and study the impact of revealing this information on the coordination problem typical of this game with multiple equilibria. We find that when no information...

We define a standard optimization problem with quadratic objective function and provide a rigorous visual proof for its solution without using calculus. We then show that such standard problem is a building block for several economic models related to microeconomics, game theory and pricing...

This paper focuses on a bargaining experiment in which the privately informed seller of a company sends a value message to the uninformed potential buyer who then proposes a price for acquiring the company. Participants are constantly in the role of either seller or buyer and interact over 30...

Similar to Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) we try to understand and explain the motivation of participants when contributing to a public good. In the Hybrid Public Good experiment each of two interacting contributors chooses an independent contribution level and three adjusted contribution...

We prove suboptimality of probability matching in prediction tasks with an arbitrary (finite) number of outcomes and repetitions. For the popular case of binary prediction tasks, we also provide a graphical representation of the result. Finally, we relate probability matching to impulse balance...

We run a laboratory experiment to investigate how the size of the group affects coordination in a bank-run game played repeatedly by participants facing different fellow depositors. For comparability purposes, we keep the coordination tightness constant across different sizes. Participants...