The current financial crisis has given rise to calls to toughen considerably the codes of corporate governance put in place in many countries to regulate corporate behaviour (e.g. the UK Combined Code). These codes vary slightly in form but tend to contain a mix of non-discretionary regulations...

Although recent research documents a positive relation between corporate transparency and the proportion of independent directors, the direction of causality is unclear. We examine a regulatory shock that substantially increased board independence for some firms, and find that information...

Occupational Health and Safety Governance (OHSG) is a branch of Corporate Governance by which the board directs and controls labor risks created by their own enterprise. The OHSG concept is relatively new; unlike Occupational Health and Safety Management, which is mostly related to the work of...

The return to economic liberalism in the Anglo-Saxon world was motivated by the apparent failure of Keynesian economic management to control the stagflation of the 1970s and early 1980s. In this context, the theories of economic liberalism, championed by Friederich von Hayek, Milton Friedman and...

Governance risks stem from the own governance of any organization. The paper puts forward an operational viewpoint of those risks, by mapping the most distinctive categories of governance analysis onto time-dependent governance variables. Afterwards, risks conveyed by the latter are measured...

Firstly, this paper brings forth an encompassing definition of investment funds intended to track down some patterns of deviant governance. Secondly, it will focus on three conspicuous types among those funds: banks, mutual funds, and hedge funds. Such approach seeks to reveal deep similarities...

Whereas a clinical approach to organizations has a well-deserved predicament, narrowing down such viewpoint to governance issues in organizations shows that there has been, so far, an almost complete neglect of this field of enquiry, on which this paper intends to make a contribution. Firstly,...

We study the optimal composition of corporate boards. Directors can be either monitoring or advisory types. Monitoring constrains the empire-building tendency of chief executive officers (CEOs). If shareholders control the board nomination process, a non-monotonic relation ensues between agency...

In this paper, we set forth a scoreboard for dealing with those risks that arise from the governance of any organization. Firstly, we introduce the subject of governance risks and, secondly, we move on to a cardinal index that not only measures up governance performance but also provides with a...

This paper provides benchmarks for monitoring costs and evaluates the net returns to shareholder activism. I model activism as a sequential decision process consisting of demand negotiations, board representation, and proxy contest and estimate the costs of each activism stage. A campaign ending...