Consider two heterogenous populations of agents who, when matched, jointly produce an output, Y. For example, teachers and classrooms of students together produce achievement, parents raise children, whose life outcomes vary in adulthood, assembly plant managers and workers produce a certain...

In social and economic networks linked agents often share additional links in common. There are two competing explanations for this phenomenon. First, agents may have a structural taste for transitive links - the returns to linking may be higher if two agents share links in common. Second,...

Consider a setting where N players, partitioned into K observable types, form a directed network. Agents' preferences over the form of the network consist of an arbitrary network benefit function (e.g., agents may have preferences over their network centrality) and a private component which is...

We introduce a test for whether agents' preferences over network structure are interdependent. Interdependent preferences induce strategic behavior since the optimal set of links directed by agent i will vary with the configuration of links directed by other agents. Our model also incorporates...

Many economic activities are embedded in networks: sets of agents and the (often) rivalrous relationships connecting them to one another. Input sourcing by ?rms, interbank lending, scienti?c research, and job search are four examples, among many, of networked economic activities. Motivated by...