We build a model of tacit collusion between firms that operate in multiple markets to study the effects of trade costs. A key feature of the model is that cartel discipline is endogenous. Thus, markets that appear segmented are strategically linked via the incentive compatibility constraint....

I survey the influence of Grossman and Hart's (1986) seminal paper in the field of International Trade. I discuss the implementation of the theory in open-economy environments and its implications for the international organization of production and the structure of international trade flows. I...

I survey the influence of Grossman and Hart's (1986) seminal paper in the field of International Trade. I discuss the implementation of the theory in open-economy environments and its implications for the international organization of production and the structure of international trade flows. I...

Recent quantitative trade models treat import tariffs as pure cost shifters so that their effects are similar to iceberg trade costs. We introduce revenue-generating import tariffs, which act as demand shifters, into the framework of Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2012), and generalize...

We study patterns of FDI in a multi-country world economy. First, we present evidence for a broad sample of countries that firms direct FDI disproportionately to markets with income levels similar to their home market. Then we develop a model featuring non-homothetic preferences for quality and...

We develop a two-country general equilibrium model where firms make separate choices about the location of R&D and high-tech production. There are two agglomeration forces: R&D spillovers and backward linkages associated with high-tech production. The latter tends to attract production to the...

What are the effects of the integration of markets for private donations for development on NGOs’ performance? How is the welfare of donors and beneficiaries affected? To answer these questions, we build a model of a market for development donations with horizontally differentiated NGOs...

We develop a new general equilibrium monopolistic competition model with variable demand elasticity, heterogeneous firms, and multiple asymmetric regions. Wages, productivity, consumption diversity, and markups across firms and markets are all endogenously determined and respond to trade...