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Capacity Choices in Liberalized Electricity Markets
Castro-Rodriguez, Fidel; Uribe, Marín; Luis, Pedro; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001
absence of any regulation, private investment decisions on capacity unambiguously lead to a socially sub-optimal outcome, and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792333
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Exclusive Contracts and Market Power: Evidence from Ocean Shipping
Uribe, Marín; Luis, Pedro - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001
There is a substantial theoretical literature on the potential effects of loyalty contracts, but a relative paucity of empirical work. This Paper employs the event study methodology to examine the effect of exclusionary contracts on firm performance in the ocean shipping industry. Shipping...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497855
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Coordination and Lock-In: Competition with Switching Costs and Network Effects
Farrell, Joseph; Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006
Switching costs and network effects bind customers to vendors if products are incompatible, locking customers or even markets in to early choices. Lock-in hinders customers from changing suppliers in response to (predictable or unpredictable) changes in efficiency, and gives vendors lucrative ex...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124423
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Strategic Supply Function Competition with Private Information
Vives, Xavier - 2009
A finite number of sellers (n) compete in schedules to supply an elastic demand. The costs of the sellers have uncertain common and private value components and there is no exogenous noise in the system. A Bayesian supply function equilibrium is characterized; the equilibrium is privately...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014202206
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Strategic Bidding in Electricity Pools with Short-Lived Bids: An Application to the Spanish Market
García-Díaz, Antón; Uribe, Marín; Luis, Pedro - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000
We generalize von der Fehr and Harbord's (1993) multi-unit auction model for the case of a deterministic demand allowing for any technology mix and elastic demand in order to account for demand side bidding. We obtain a general characterization of the equilibrium and show that the Cournot model...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789069
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Strategic Supply Function Competition with Private Information
Vives, Xavier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008
A finite number of sellers (n) compete in schedules to supply an elastic demand. The costs of the sellers have uncertain common and private value components and there is no exogenous noise in the system. A Bayesian supply function equilibrium is characterized; the equilibrium is privately...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789071
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Why every Economist should Learn some Auction Theory
Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000
This is a preliminary draft of an Invited Symposium paper for the World Congress of the Econometric Society to be held in Seattle in August 2000. We discuss the strong connections between auction theory and 'standard' economic theory, and argue that auction-theoretic tools and intuitions can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792157
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Economic Integration and Investment Incentives in Regulated Industries
Auriol, Emmanuelle; Biancini, Sara - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
The paper studies the impact of market integration on investment incentives in non-competitive industries. It distinguishes between investment in transportation and production cost-reducing technologies. Each domestic firm is controlled by a national regulator in a common market made of two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005012490
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Government Outsourcing: Public Contracting with Private Monopoly
Auriol, Emmanuelle; Picard, Pierre M - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006
The paper studies the impact of government budget constraint in a pure adverse selection problem of monopoly regulation … to regulation is proposed in which firms are free to enter the market and to choose their price and output levels … than traditional regulation where governments commit to both investment and operation cash-flows. This is especially …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067470
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A Theory of BOT Concession Contracts
Auriol, Emmanuelle; Picard, Pierre M - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
In this paper, we discuss the choice for build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) concessions when governments and managers do not share the same information regarding the operation characteristics of a facility. We show that larger shadow costs of public funds and larger information asymmetries entice...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008921773