This paper studies how the existence of a potential entrant influences an incumbent’s choice of quality in a model of vertical product differentiation and entry. Both firms face fixed set-up costs and quality-dependent costs of production, and compete on quality and price. With identical...

Equilibrium prices of the variants of a differentiated commodity are shown to increase if the variants become closer substitutes, under a set of circumstances, which is by no means pathological. Rather, the underlying argument has a bearing on market prices, whenever a potential buyer does not...

In a model of vertical product differentiation, duopolistic firms face quality-dependent costs and compete on quality and price in two segmented markets. Minimum quality standards, set uniformly or according to the principle of mutual recognition, can be used to increase welfare. The analysis...

We develop a model of search among substitutes for the best combination of commodity variant and price, in which the structure of search costs can be manipulated by the suppliers of these variants, e.g. by joining an existing market or opening a new one. We analyse the subgame perfect equilibria...

In a model of vertical product differentiation, duopolistic firms face quality-dependent costs and compete on quality and price in two segmented markets. Minimum quality standards, set according to the principle of Mutual Recognition, can be used to increase welfare. The results of the one-shot...

Unprecendented growth of barter is a striking phenomenon of Russia's transition. The explanations of barter include tight monetary policy, tax evasion and poor financial intermediation. We show that the market power may also be important. We build a model of imperfect competition in which firms...

We generalize the War of Attrition model to allow for N+K firms competing for N prizes. Two special cases are of particular interest. First, if firms continue to pay their full costs after dropping out (as in a standard-setting context), each firm’s exit time is independent both of K and of...

We study duopoly pricing in the market for mobile phone service, which features network externalities, switching costs, and consumer heterogeneity. We introduce a steady state approach that enables a tractable analysis without endgame effects. The model can generate a variety of testable...

The externalities advertisers receive from newspaper readers and that operating system users receive from software developers are among the leading features of those “platform” industries. However, they are rarely incorporated into applied models of imperfect competition. We argue this...