Showing 1 - 6 of 6
This paper investigates the effect of corruption on competition in government procurement auctions. Our assumption is that the bureaucrat (i.e. the agent that administers the market), if corrupt, may provide a favour in exchange for a bribe. The favour we consider in most of our analysis is the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662229
bargaining on regulation. In a simple two way trade model a la Brander and Spencer, we take into account the three following … features of regulatory measures: a) a regulation raises the cost not only of foreign producers but also of domestic producers …; b) a regulation also creates a fixed cost which is entirely supported by foreign exporters; c) a regulation may provide …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114316
and under optimal regulation, production in these sectors is inefficiently low. The small open country is relatively … for tradable goods. Free trade with optimal regulation is Pareto dominated by autarky with optimal regulation when, under …’ regulatory policies cannot be considered separately from trade policy instruments, when regulation is characterized by serious …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661639
We analyse an oligopoly model in which differentiated criminal organizations compete on criminal activities and engage in corruption to avoid punishment. When law enforcers are sufficiently well-paid, difficult to bribe and corruption detection highly probable, we show that increasing policing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005788890
Is competition for donations between development NGOs good for welfare? We address this question in a monopolistic competition model à la Salop (1979). NGOs - defined by the non-distribution constraint - compete for donations from donors by exerting fundraising effort. If the market size is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791315
regulation in South. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084080