This paper studies how the existence of a potential entrant influences an incumbent’s choice of quality in a model of vertical product differentiation and entry. Both firms face fixed set-up costs and quality-dependent costs of production, and compete on quality and price. With identical...

We develop a model that examines the capital structure and investment decisions of regulated firms in a setting that incorporates two key institutional features of the public utilities sector in many countries: firms are partially owned by the state and regulators are not necessarily...

I propose an evolutionary game model to study competition among a large number of firms, in which I take into account the issues of social responsibility, government monitoring of environmental compliance and consumer boycott. A large number of firms sell their homogeneous good in an almost...

Sports organizations, Hollywood studios and TV channels grant satellite and cable networks exclusive rights to televise their matches, movies and media contents. Exclusive distribution prevents viewers from watching attractive programs, and reduces the TV-distributors incentives to compete in...

We model a new effect of exclusivity on non-contractible investments in buyer/seller relationships. By restricting the buyer to purchase from only one seller, exclusivity increases the buyer’s costs of haggling during renegotiation and hence the seller’s relative bargaining power and...

Motivated by the regulatory debate in electricity markets, we seek to understand how market design affects market performance through its impact on investment incentives. For this purpose, we study a two-stage game in which firms choose their capacities under demand uncertainty prior to bidding...

We study optimal merger policy in a dynamic model in which the presence of scale economies implies that firms can reduce costs through either internal investment in building capital or through mergers. The model, which we solve computationally, allows firms to invest or propose mergers according...

Recent years have witnessed an increased interest, by competition agencies, in assessing the competitive effects of partial acquisitions. We propose an empirical structural methodology to examine quantitatively the unilateral impact of partial acquisitions involving pure financial interests...

Flexibility - the ability to react swiftly to others' choices - facilitates collusion by reducing gains from defection before opponents react. Under imperfect monitoring, however, flexibility may also hinder collusion by inducing punishment after too few noisy signals. The combination of these...