Showing 1 - 9 of 9
This paper investigates the effect of corruption on competition in government procurement auctions. Our assumption is that the bureaucrat (i.e. the agent that administers the market), if corrupt, may provide a favour in exchange for a bribe. The favour we consider in most of our analysis is the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662229
The paper revisits the conventional wisdom according to which vertical restrictions on retail prices help upstream firms to collude. We analyse the scope for collusion with and without resale price maintenance (RPM) when retailers observe local shocks on demand or retail costs. In the absence of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792032
Large public bureaucracies are commonly regarded as less efficient than modern private corporations. This paper explores how the degree of discretionary power might account for this difference in efficiency. Indeed, increasing the discretionary power of the intermediate layers of an organization...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008873329
We propose a theory of supervision with endogenous transaction costs. A principle delegates part of his authority to a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114332
highlight the deficiencies in the current formal theory of collusion. The Sugar Institute did not fix prices or output. Prices …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504565
The impact of demand growth on the collusion possibilities is investigated in a Cournot supergame where market growth may trigger future entry and the collusive agreement is enforced by the most profitable 'grim trigger strategies' available. It is shown that even in situations where perfect...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497875
Flexibility - the ability to react swiftly to others' choices - facilitates collusion by reducing gains from defection before opponents react. Under imperfect monitoring, however, flexibility may also hinder collusion by inducing punishment after too few noisy signals. The combination of these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084106
We show that multimarket contact facilitates tacit collusion in the US airline industry using two complementary approaches. First, we show that the more extensive is the overlap in the markets that the two firms serve, i) the more firms internalize the effect of their pricing decisions on the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084300
The most important issues in auction design are the traditional concerns of competition policy-preventing collusive, predatory, and entry deterring behaviour. Ascending and uniform-price auctions are particularly vulnerable to these problems (we discuss radiospectrum and football TV-rights...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114514