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Entry in Telecommunication: Customer Loyalty, Price Sensitivity and Access Prices

Lommerud, Kjell Erik; Sørgard, Lars - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

The purpose of this article is to investigate the prospects for entry into an existing network in the telecommunication industry, and how public policy may promote a more competitive outcome. We apply a model that captures the fact that the incumbent has an installed base of loyal consumers,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792516

Market Entry and Roll-out With Product Differentiation

Levine, Paul L; Rickman, Neil; Tzavara, Dionisia - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

This Paper examines a general problem exemplified by post-auction (third generation ‘3G’) mobile telecommunications markets and by recent developments in the UK market for postal services. When entering these (or any other) markets, firms must often decide on the degree of coverage...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124418

Unbundling the incumbent: Evidence from UK broadband

Nardotto, Mattia; Valletti, Tommaso; Verboven, Frank - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

network available to other companies (local loop unbundling, or LLU). Entrants are then able to upgrade their individual lines … that over the course of time, many entrants have begun to take advantage of LLU. However, unbundling has little or no … technology (cable) which is not subject to regulation, and what we discover is that inter-platform competition has a positive …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083592

Competition vs. Regulation in Mobile Telecommunications

Stennek, Johan; Tangerås, Thomas P. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

This paper questions whether competition can replace sector-specific regulation of mobile telecommunications. We show …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661431

Efficient Exclusion

Moen, Espen R; Riis, Christian - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

In an important paper, Aghion and Bolton (1987) argue that a buyer and a seller may agree on high liquidation damages in order to extract rents from future suppliers. As this may distort future trade, it may be socially wasteful. We argue that Aghion and Bolton's analysis is incomplete in some...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497799

Acquisitions, Entry, and Innovation in Network Industries

Norbäck, Pehr-Johan; Persson, Lars; Tåg, Joacim Ingemar - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

In industries with network effects, incumbents’ installed bases create barriers to entry that discourage entrepreneurs from developing new innovations. Yet, entry is not the only commercialization route for entrepreneurs. We show that the option of selling to an incumbent increases innovation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083667

Should Uniform Pricing Contraints be Imposed on Entrants?

Hoernig, Steffen - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

This paper analyses the effects of universal service obligations, such as uniform pricing, coverage constraints and price caps, on markets newly opened to competition, e.g. broadband services. We show that the requirement of uniform pricing has strong repercussions on coverage decisions. Imposed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136722

Monopolistic Competition: Beyond the CES

Kokovin, Sergey; Thisse, Jacques-François; Zhelobodko, … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

We propose a general model of monopolistic competition and derive a complete characterization of the market equilibrium based on an Arrow-Pratt measure of concavity of the utility, interpreted as the relative love for variety. When the relative love for variety increases with the consumption...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008466345

Strategic Advantage and the Optimal Exercise of Entry Options

Perotti, Enrico C; Rossetto, Silvia - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

We investigate the timing and the valuation of strategic investment aimed at enhancing entry opportunities in related market segments. As demand is uncertain, entry options should be exercised at the optimal time, trading off the market share gain against the option to wait until more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662306

Buyers' Coordination and Entry

Fumagalli, Chiara; Motta, Massimo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

Miscoordination of buyers might prevent entry in an industry with an incumbent and a more efficient potential entrant. Buyers' power therefore favours entry by eliminating coordination problems. We also identify a mechanism which facilitates entry: if the potential entrant could credibly offer...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789109