Showing 1 - 7 of 7
Destination countries can adopt selective immigration policies to improve migrants' quality. Screening potential migrants on the basis of observable characteristics also influences their self-selection on unobservables. We propose a model that analyzes the effects of selective immigration...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011396748
A growing number of OECD countries are leaning toward adopting quality-selective immigration policies. The underlying assumption behind such policies is that more skill-selection should raise immigrants' average quality (or education level). This view tends to neglect two important dynamic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010221705
Destination countries have been resorting to selective immigration policies to improve migrants' quality. We propose a model that analyzes the effects of selective immigration policies on migrants' quality, measured by their wages at destination. Screening potential migrants on the basis of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084721
In many countries, sickness absence financed by generous insurance benefits has become an important concern in the policy debate. It turns out that there are strong variations in absence behavior between local geographical areas, and it has been difficult to explain these variations by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009524372
We show that concerns for fairness may have dramatic consequences for the optimal provision of incentives in a moral hazard context. Incentive contracts that are optimal when there are only selfish actors become inferior when some agents are concerned with fairness. Conversely, contracts that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792499
The paper shows that an increase in competition has two effects on managerial incentives: it increases the probability of liquidation, which has a positive effect on managerial effort, but it also reduces the firm’s profits, which may make it less attractive to induce high effort. Thus, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124445
This Paper reports on a two-task principal-agent experiment in which only one task is contractible. The principal can either offer a piece-rate contract or a (voluntary) bonus to the agent. Bonus contracts strongly outperform piece rate contracts. Many principals reward high efforts on both...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114195