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Welfare Analysis of Regulating Mobile Termination Rates in the UK (with an Application to the Orange/T-Mobile Merger)

Harbord, David; Hoernig, Steffen - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

This paper presents results from a calibrated welfare model of the UK mobile telephony market which includes many mobile networks; calls to and from the fixed network; networkbased price discrimination; and call externalities. The analysis focuses on the short-run effects of adopting lower...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468563

The Breakdown of Connectivity Breakdowns

Hoernig, Steffen - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

finite call and receiving prices exist for a large and realistic range of call externality values. This allows regulation of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084152

Calling Circles: Network Competition with Non-Uniform Calling Patterns

Hoernig, Steffen; Inderst, Roman; Valletti, Tommaso - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

We introduce a flexible model of telecommunications network competition with non-uniform calling patterns, which account for the fact that customers tend to make most calls to a small subset of people. Equilibrium call prices are distorted away from marginal cost, and competitive intensity is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008784708

Competition Between Multiple Asymmetric Networks: Theory and Applications

Hoernig, Steffen - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

theory side, we provide a criterion for stability in expectations and determine equilibrium outcomes in linear and two …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008679877

Tariff-Mediated Network Externalities: Is Regulatory Intervention Any Good?

Hoernig, Steffen - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

Mobile phone networks' practice of charging higher prices for off-net than for on-net calls has been pinpointed as the source of two competition problems: underprovision of calls and permanent disadvantages for small networks. We consider these allegations and four different remedies: limiting...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114399

Asymmetric Broadband Wholesale Regulation

Hoernig, Steffen - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

existing access regulation is based on a single essential network. We show that continued asymmetric access regulation of one … network does not control sufficiently for market power and benefits the unregulated network, and that symmetric regulation … would lead to higher consumer surplus. Furthermore, the whole setup of access regulation may not be viable in the long run …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009024485

The Race for Telecoms Infrastructure Investment with Bypass: Can Access Regulation Achieve the First-best?

Vareda, Bastos; Miguel, João; Hoernig, Steffen - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

regulation if the follower’s private incentives are dominated by business-stealing. Here access holidays can improve welfare by …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497926

Geographic Access Rules and Investments

Bourreau, Marc; Cambini, Carlo; Hoernig, Steffen - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

We analyze competition between vertically integrated infrastructure operators that provide access in different geographical areas. A regulator may impose a uniform access price, set local access rates, or deregulate access locally. We analyze the impact of these alternative regulatory regimes on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083224

Fixed-Mobile Integration

Bourreau, Marc; Cambini, Carlo; Hoernig, Steffen - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

Often, fixed-line incumbents also own the largest mobile network. We consider the effect of this joint ownership on market outcomes. Our model predicts that while fixed-to-mobile call prices to the integrated mobile network are more efficient than under separation, those to rival mobile networks...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083776

On-Net and Off-Net Pricing on Asymmetric Telecommunications Networks

Hoernig, Steffen - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

The differential between on-net and off-net prices, for example on mobile telephony networks, is an issue that is hotly debated between telecoms operators and regulators. Small operators contend that their competitors' high off-net prices are anticompetitive. We show that if the utility of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661878