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Bilateral Market Power and Vertical Integration in the Spanish Electricity Spot Market

Kühn, Kai-Uwe; Machado, Matilde Pinto - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

The Spanish electricity spot market is highly concentrated both on the seller and the buyer side. Furthermore, unlike electricity spot markets in other deregulated electricity systems, large buyers and sellers are typically vertically integrated. This allows both large net sellers and large net...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123592

Price Squeezes in a Regulatory Environment

Bouckaert, Jan; Verboven, Frank - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

practitioners and economists, taking the existing regulatory environment as fixed. Based on the degree of existing regulation (full …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497999

Unbundling the incumbent: Evidence from UK broadband

Nardotto, Mattia; Valletti, Tommaso; Verboven, Frank - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

network available to other companies (local loop unbundling, or LLU). Entrants are then able to upgrade their individual lines … that over the course of time, many entrants have begun to take advantage of LLU. However, unbundling has little or no … technology (cable) which is not subject to regulation, and what we discover is that inter-platform competition has a positive …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083592

Vertical Control of a Distribution Network - An Empirical Analysis of Magazines

Ferrari, Stijn; Verboven, Frank - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

How does an upstream firm determine the size of its distribution network, and what is the role of vertical restraints? To address these questions we develop and estimate two models of outlet entry, starting from the basic trade-off between market expansion and fixed costs. In the coordinated...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468630

Market Definition with Differentiated Products - Lessons from the Car Market

Brenkers, Randy; Verboven, Frank - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

background of the new block exemption regulation for cars in Europe, we explore an econometric approach to define the relevant … market share thresholds stipulated in the block exemption regulation. We find that, if we would have used an approach based …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136670

Exclusive dealing as a barrier to entry? Evidence from automobiles

Nurski, Laura; Verboven, Frank - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

Exclusive dealing contracts between manufacturers and retailers force new entrants to set up their own costly dealer networks to enter the market. We ask whether such contracts may act as an entry barrier, and provide an empirical analysis of the European car market. We first estimate a demand...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083855

Excess Entry, Vertical Integration and Welfare

Kühn, Kai-Uwe; Vives, Xavier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1995

This paper provides a systematic analysis of the welfare effects of vertical integration by a monopolistic input supplier into a monopolistically competitive downstream industry. We give sufficient conditions on consumer preferences that lead to Pareto improving vertical integration. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661460

Quantifying the Effects from Horizontal Mergers in European Competition Policy

Ivaldi, Marc; Verboven, Frank - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

This Paper starts from a recent case studying how merger analysis in Europe may potentially be improved through simulation analysis. Starting from the product and geographic market definition in the Merger Decision, we formulate and estimate an oligopoly model with differentiated products. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666636

The Coordinated Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products Markets

Kühn, Kai-Uwe - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

The Paper addresses the issue of coordinated effects of mergers in the framework of a differentiated products model. Firms’ assets are product varieties that can be sold individually or entirely transferred to another firm in a merger. We show that under symmetric optimal punishment schemes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005667006

Communication, Renegotiation, and the Scope for Collusion

Cooper, David J.; Kühn, Kai-Uwe - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We use experiments to analyze what type of communication is most effective in achieving cooperation in a simple collusion game. Consistent with the existing literature on communication and collusion, even minimal communication leads to a short run increase in collusion. However, in a limited...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008558586