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Price Squeezes in a Regulatory Environment

Bouckaert, Jan; Verboven, Frank - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

practitioners and economists, taking the existing regulatory environment as fixed. Based on the degree of existing regulation (full …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497999

Unbundling the incumbent: Evidence from UK broadband

Nardotto, Mattia; Valletti, Tommaso; Verboven, Frank - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

network available to other companies (local loop unbundling, or LLU). Entrants are then able to upgrade their individual lines … that over the course of time, many entrants have begun to take advantage of LLU. However, unbundling has little or no … technology (cable) which is not subject to regulation, and what we discover is that inter-platform competition has a positive …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083592

Vertical Control of a Distribution Network - An Empirical Analysis of Magazines

Ferrari, Stijn; Verboven, Frank - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

How does an upstream firm determine the size of its distribution network, and what is the role of vertical restraints? To address these questions we develop and estimate two models of outlet entry, starting from the basic trade-off between market expansion and fixed costs. In the coordinated...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468630

Market Definition with Differentiated Products - Lessons from the Car Market

Brenkers, Randy; Verboven, Frank - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

background of the new block exemption regulation for cars in Europe, we explore an econometric approach to define the relevant … market share thresholds stipulated in the block exemption regulation. We find that, if we would have used an approach based …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136670

Exclusive Contracts, Loss to Delay and Incentives to Invest

Groh, Christian; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

We model a new effect of exclusivity on non-contractible investments in buyer/seller relationships. By restricting the buyer to purchase from only one seller, exclusivity increases the buyer’s costs of haggling during renegotiation and hence the seller’s relative bargaining power and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497871

Exclusive dealing as a barrier to entry? Evidence from automobiles

Nurski, Laura; Verboven, Frank - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

Exclusive dealing contracts between manufacturers and retailers force new entrants to set up their own costly dealer networks to enter the market. We ask whether such contracts may act as an entry barrier, and provide an empirical analysis of the European car market. We first estimate a demand...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083855

Leniency Policies and Illegal Transactions

Buccirossi, Paolo; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

We study the consequences of leniency - reduced legal sanctions for wrongdoers who spontaneously self-report to law enforcers - on sequential, bilateral, illegal transactions such as corruption, manager-auditor collusion, or drug deals. It is known that leniency helps to deter illegal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124229

Legalizing Bribe Giving

Dufwenberg, Martin; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

A model of harassment bribes (paid for services one is entitled to) is developed and used to analyze the recent proposal to legalize paying bribes while increasing fines on accepting bribes. We explore performance as regards corruption deterrence and public service provision. A modified scheme,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083969

Divide et Impera: Optimal Leniency Programmes

Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

Leniency programmes (or policies) reduce sanctions against cartel members that self-report to the Antitrust Authority. We focus on their ability to directly deter cartels and analogous criminal organizations by undermining internal trust, increasing individual incentives to ‘cheat’ on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136696

Bank Mergers, Competition and Liquidity

Carletti, Elena; Hartmann, Philipp; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

We model the impact of bank mergers on loan competition, reserve holdings and aggregate liquidity. A merger creates an internal money market that affects reserve holdings and induces financial cost advantages, but also withdraws liquidity from the interbank market. We assess changes in liquidity...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497912