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Transmission Rights and Market Power on Electric Power Networks I: Financial Rights

Joskow, Paul L; Tirole, Jean - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

We examine whether and how the allocation of financial transmission rights affects the behavior of electricity generators and electricity consumers with market power in the electricity market. The analysis recognizes that the ultimate allocation of rights is endogenous, depending both on whether...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504688

Transmission Rights and Market Power on Electric Power Networks. II: Physical Rights

Joskow, Paul L; Tirole, Jean - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

We examine whether and how the allocation of physical rights to utilize congested transmission links affects the behavior of electricity generators and electricity consumers with market power in the electricity market. The paper extends the analysis of financial transmission rights contained in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656250

Price Squeezes in a Regulatory Environment

Bouckaert, Jan; Verboven, Frank - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

practitioners and economists, taking the existing regulatory environment as fixed. Based on the degree of existing regulation (full …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497999

Unbundling the incumbent: Evidence from UK broadband

Nardotto, Mattia; Valletti, Tommaso; Verboven, Frank - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

network available to other companies (local loop unbundling, or LLU). Entrants are then able to upgrade their individual lines … that over the course of time, many entrants have begun to take advantage of LLU. However, unbundling has little or no … technology (cable) which is not subject to regulation, and what we discover is that inter-platform competition has a positive …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083592

Vertical Control of a Distribution Network - An Empirical Analysis of Magazines

Ferrari, Stijn; Verboven, Frank - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

How does an upstream firm determine the size of its distribution network, and what is the role of vertical restraints? To address these questions we develop and estimate two models of outlet entry, starting from the basic trade-off between market expansion and fixed costs. In the coordinated...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468630

Cooperation Among Competitors: The Economics of Credit Card Associations

Rochet, Jean-Charles; Tirole, Jean - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

The paper analyzes two controversial features of the credit card industry. The first is the cooperative determination of the interchange fee by member banks in credit card associations (Visa and MasterCard). The interchange fee is the ``access charge'' paid by the merchants' banks, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136500

Market Definition with Differentiated Products - Lessons from the Car Market

Brenkers, Randy; Verboven, Frank - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

background of the new block exemption regulation for cars in Europe, we explore an econometric approach to define the relevant … market share thresholds stipulated in the block exemption regulation. We find that, if we would have used an approach based …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136670

Exclusive dealing as a barrier to entry? Evidence from automobiles

Nurski, Laura; Verboven, Frank - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

Exclusive dealing contracts between manufacturers and retailers force new entrants to set up their own costly dealer networks to enter the market. We ask whether such contracts may act as an entry barrier, and provide an empirical analysis of the European car market. We first estimate a demand...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083855

Essential Facility Financing and Market Structure

Caillaud, Bernard; Tirole, Jean - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

The Paper analyses the funding of an infrastructure project (high speed train line, platform, tunnel, harbor, regional airport, fibre-to-the-home network, etc.) in a situation in which an incumbent operator has private information about market profitability (demand, cost) and the infrastructure...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662107

Entry and Competition in Differentiated Products Markets

Schaumans, Catherine; Verboven, Frank - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

We propose a methodology for estimating the competition effects from entry when firms sell differentiated products. We first derive precise conditions under which Bresnahan and Reiss' entry threshold ratios (ETRs) can be used to test for the presence and to measure the magnitude of competition...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009003374