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Efficiency Gains and Structural Remedies in Merger Control

Vasconcelos, Helder - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

This paper studies the role of structural remedies in merger control in a Cournot setting where (endogenous) mergers are motivated by prospective efficiency gains and must be submitted to an Antitrust Authority (AA) which might require partial divestiture for approval. Both positive and negative...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498161

Can the Failing Firm Defense Rule be Counterproductive?

Vasconcelos, Helder - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

This paper studies the role of the failing firm defense (FFD) concept in merger control in a Cournot setting where: (i) endogenous mergers are motivated by prospective efficiency gains; and (ii) mergers must be submitted to an Antitrust Authority which might require partial divestiture for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084654

Price Squeezes in a Regulatory Environment

Bouckaert, Jan; Verboven, Frank - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

practitioners and economists, taking the existing regulatory environment as fixed. Based on the degree of existing regulation (full …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497999

Unbundling the incumbent: Evidence from UK broadband

Nardotto, Mattia; Valletti, Tommaso; Verboven, Frank - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

network available to other companies (local loop unbundling, or LLU). Entrants are then able to upgrade their individual lines … that over the course of time, many entrants have begun to take advantage of LLU. However, unbundling has little or no … technology (cable) which is not subject to regulation, and what we discover is that inter-platform competition has a positive …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083592

Vertical Control of a Distribution Network - An Empirical Analysis of Magazines

Ferrari, Stijn; Verboven, Frank - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

How does an upstream firm determine the size of its distribution network, and what is the role of vertical restraints? To address these questions we develop and estimate two models of outlet entry, starting from the basic trade-off between market expansion and fixed costs. In the coordinated...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468630

Market Definition with Differentiated Products - Lessons from the Car Market

Brenkers, Randy; Verboven, Frank - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

background of the new block exemption regulation for cars in Europe, we explore an econometric approach to define the relevant … market share thresholds stipulated in the block exemption regulation. We find that, if we would have used an approach based …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136670

Exclusive dealing as a barrier to entry? Evidence from automobiles

Nurski, Laura; Verboven, Frank - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

Exclusive dealing contracts between manufacturers and retailers force new entrants to set up their own costly dealer networks to enter the market. We ask whether such contracts may act as an entry barrier, and provide an empirical analysis of the European car market. We first estimate a demand...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083855

Quantifying the Effects from Horizontal Mergers in European Competition Policy

Ivaldi, Marc; Verboven, Frank - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

This Paper starts from a recent case studying how merger analysis in Europe may potentially be improved through simulation analysis. Starting from the product and geographic market definition in the Merger Decision, we formulate and estimate an oligopoly model with differentiated products. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666636

Cross-Border Merger Waves

Fumagalli, Eileen; Vasconcelos, Helder - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

This paper proposes a sequential merger formation game with cost synergies to study how trade policy can influence firms' choice between domestic and cross-border mergers in an international Cournot oligopoly. We find that the equilibrium market structure depends heavily on: (i) the level of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791572

Price Discrimination under Customer Recognition and Mergers

Esteves, Rosa Branca; Vasconcelos, Helder - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

This paper studies the interaction between horizontal mergers and price discrimination by endogenizing the merger formation process in the context of a repeated purchase model with two periods and three firms wherein firms may engage in Behaviour-Based Price Discrimination (BBPD). From a merger...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468542