This paper studies how the existence of a potential entrant influences an incumbent’s choice of quality in a model of vertical product differentiation and entry. Both firms face fixed set-up costs and quality-dependent costs of production, and compete on quality and price. With identical...

This paper examines the rationale for multilateral agreements to limit investment subsidies. The welfare ranking of symmetric multilateral subsidy games is shown to depend on whether or not investment levels are "friendly", raising rival profits in total, and/or strategic complements, raising...

We develop a model in which two regional governments compete for a mobile oligopolistic firm by publicly providing local inputs. The central mechanism of our model is the interaction of an agglomeration advantage (partial non-rivalness of the local input) and an agglomeration disadvantage (fixed...

The recent extensive study of vertical product differentiation models has allowed for the analysis of international trade issues in the presence of country asymmetries in terms of product qualities, technology, costs, market size, and income. In the presence of such asymmetries, national...

The recent extensive study of vertical product differentiation models has allowed for the analysis of international trade issues in the presence of country asymmetries in terms of product qualities, technology, costs, market size and income. In the presence of such asymmetries, national...

Equilibrium prices of the variants of a differentiated commodity are shown to increase if the variants become closer substitutes, under a set of circumstances, which is by no means pathological. Rather, the underlying argument has a bearing on market prices, whenever a potential buyer does not...

In a model of vertical product differentiation, duopolistic firms face quality-dependent costs and compete on quality and price in two segmented markets. Minimum quality standards, set uniformly or according to the principle of mutual recognition, can be used to increase welfare. The analysis...

We develop a model of search among substitutes for the best combination of commodity variant and price, in which the structure of search costs can be manipulated by the suppliers of these variants, e.g. by joining an existing market or opening a new one. We analyse the subgame perfect equilibria...

In a model of vertical product differentiation, duopolistic firms face quality-dependent costs and compete on quality and price in two segmented markets. Minimum quality standards, set according to the principle of Mutual Recognition, can be used to increase welfare. The results of the one-shot...