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White, Lucy - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

We investigate the robustness of the new foreclosure doctrine and its associated welfare implications to the introduction of incomplete information. In particular, we let the upstream firm’s marginal cost be private information, unknown to the downstream firms. The previous literature has...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498007

Do Vertical Mergers Facilitate Upstream Collusion?

Nocke, Volker; White, Lucy - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

In this Paper we investigate the impact of vertical mergers on upstream firms’ ability to sustain collusion. We show in a number of models that the net effect of vertical integration is to facilitate collusion. Several effects arise. When upstream offers are secret, vertical mergers facilitate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791331

Strategic Supply Function Competition with Private Information

Vives, Xavier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

A finite number of sellers (n) compete in schedules to supply an elastic demand. The costs of the sellers have uncertain common and private value components and there is no exogenous noise in the system. A Bayesian supply function equilibrium is characterized; the equilibrium is privately...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789071

Entry in Telecommunication: Customer Loyalty, Price Sensitivity and Access Prices

Lommerud, Kjell Erik; Sørgard, Lars - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

The purpose of this article is to investigate the prospects for entry into an existing network in the telecommunication industry, and how public policy may promote a more competitive outcome. We apply a model that captures the fact that the incumbent has an installed base of loyal consumers,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792516

Regulating a Multi-Utility Firm

Calzolari, Giacomo; Scarpa, Carlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

We study the regulation of a utility firm which is active in a competitive unregulated sector as well. If the firm … and quantity competition) and also optimal regulation. Accounting for the several effects of regulation on the unregulated … market, we show the existence of an informational externality, in that regulation provides useful information to the rival …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124135

Selling to a cartel of retailers: a model of hub-and-spoke collusion

Sahuguet, Nicolas; Walckiers, Alexis - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

This model describes the working of hub-and-spoke collusion that has been discussed recently by competition policy authorities. We develop a model of tacit collusion between a manufacturer and two retailers, competing a la Rotemberg and Saloner (1986). The best collusive equilibrium between...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083474

Leniency Policies and Illegal Transactions

Buccirossi, Paolo; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

We study the consequences of leniency - reduced legal sanctions for wrongdoers who spontaneously self-report to law enforcers - on sequential, bilateral, illegal transactions such as corruption, manager-auditor collusion, or drug deals. It is known that leniency helps to deter illegal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124229

Optimal State-Contingent Regulation under Limited Liability

Gary-Bobo, Robert J.; Spiegel, Yossi - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

We consider an optimal regulation model in which the regulated firm’s production cost is subject to random, publicly …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114162

Vertical Merger, Collusion, and Disruptive Buyers

Nocke, Volker; White, Lucy - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

In a repeated game setting of a vertically related industry, we study the collusive effects of vertical mergers. We show that any vertical merger facilitates upstream collusion, no matter how large (in terms of capacity or size of product portfolio) the integrated downstream buyer. But a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468660

Inference on Vertical Contracts between Manufacturers and Retailers Allowing for Non Linear Pricing and Resale Price Maintenance

Bonnet, Céline; Dubois, Pierre - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

A methodology is presented allowing manufacturers and retailers vertical contracting in their pricing strategies on a differentiated product market to be introduced. This contribution allows price-cost margins to be recovered from estimates of demand parameters both under linear pricing models...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123651