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Do Vertical Mergers Facilitate Upstream Collusion?

Nocke, Volker; White, Lucy - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

In this Paper we investigate the impact of vertical mergers on upstream firms’ ability to sustain collusion. We show in a number of models that the net effect of vertical integration is to facilitate collusion. Several effects arise. When upstream offers are secret, vertical mergers facilitate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791331

Strategic Supply Function Competition with Private Information

Vives, Xavier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

A finite number of sellers (n) compete in schedules to supply an elastic demand. The costs of the sellers have uncertain common and private value components and there is no exogenous noise in the system. A Bayesian supply function equilibrium is characterized; the equilibrium is privately...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789071

Entry in Telecommunication: Customer Loyalty, Price Sensitivity and Access Prices

Lommerud, Kjell Erik; Sørgard, Lars - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

The purpose of this article is to investigate the prospects for entry into an existing network in the telecommunication industry, and how public policy may promote a more competitive outcome. We apply a model that captures the fact that the incumbent has an installed base of loyal consumers,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792516

Market Entry and Roll-out With Product Differentiation

Levine, Paul L; Rickman, Neil; Tzavara, Dionisia - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

This Paper examines a general problem exemplified by post-auction (third generation ‘3G’) mobile telecommunications markets and by recent developments in the UK market for postal services. When entering these (or any other) markets, firms must often decide on the degree of coverage...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124418

Unbundling the incumbent: Evidence from UK broadband

Nardotto, Mattia; Valletti, Tommaso; Verboven, Frank - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

network available to other companies (local loop unbundling, or LLU). Entrants are then able to upgrade their individual lines … that over the course of time, many entrants have begun to take advantage of LLU. However, unbundling has little or no … technology (cable) which is not subject to regulation, and what we discover is that inter-platform competition has a positive …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083592

Competition vs. Regulation in Mobile Telecommunications

Stennek, Johan; Tangerås, Thomas P. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

This paper questions whether competition can replace sector-specific regulation of mobile telecommunications. We show …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661431

Efficient Exclusion

Moen, Espen R; Riis, Christian - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

In an important paper, Aghion and Bolton (1987) argue that a buyer and a seller may agree on high liquidation damages in order to extract rents from future suppliers. As this may distort future trade, it may be socially wasteful. We argue that Aghion and Bolton's analysis is incomplete in some...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497799

Selling to a cartel of retailers: a model of hub-and-spoke collusion

Sahuguet, Nicolas; Walckiers, Alexis - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

This model describes the working of hub-and-spoke collusion that has been discussed recently by competition policy authorities. We develop a model of tacit collusion between a manufacturer and two retailers, competing a la Rotemberg and Saloner (1986). The best collusive equilibrium between...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083474

Acquisitions, Entry, and Innovation in Network Industries

Norbäck, Pehr-Johan; Persson, Lars; Tåg, Joacim Ingemar - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

In industries with network effects, incumbents’ installed bases create barriers to entry that discourage entrepreneurs from developing new innovations. Yet, entry is not the only commercialization route for entrepreneurs. We show that the option of selling to an incumbent increases innovation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083667

Leniency Policies and Illegal Transactions

Buccirossi, Paolo; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

We study the consequences of leniency - reduced legal sanctions for wrongdoers who spontaneously self-report to law enforcers - on sequential, bilateral, illegal transactions such as corruption, manager-auditor collusion, or drug deals. It is known that leniency helps to deter illegal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124229