The paper offers a new theoretical framework to examine the role of intermediaries between creators and users of new inventions. We find that uncertainty about the profitability of investing in new inventions generates a basis for intermediation. An intermediary may provide an opportunity to...

We study and endogenous growth model where a profit-motivated R&D sector coexists with the introduction of free blueprints invented by philanthropists. These goods are priced at marginal cost, contrary to proprietary ones, which are produced by a monopoly owned by the inventor. We show that...

In industries with network effects, incumbents’ installed bases create barriers to entry that discourage entrepreneurs from developing new innovations. Yet, entry is not the only commercialization route for entrepreneurs. We show that the option of selling to an incumbent increases innovation...

This Paper studies a model of the distribution of income under bounded needs. Utility derived from any given good reaches a bliss point at a finite consumption level of that good. On the other hand, introducing new varieties always increases utility. It is assumed that each variety is owned by a...

Digital goods are bit strings, sequences of 0s and 1s, that have economic value. They are distinguished from other goods by five characteristics: digital goods are non-rival, infinitely expansible, discrete, aspatial, and recombinant. The New Economy is one where the economics of digital goods...

Patents are a useful but imperfect reward for innovation. In sectors like pharmaceuticals, where monopoly distortions seem particularly severe, there is growing international political pressure to identify alternatives to patents that could lower prices. Innovation prizes and other non-patent...

This Paper examines how different unionization structures affect firms' innovation incentives and industry employment. We distinguish three modes of unionization with increasing degree of centralization: (1) ‘decentralization’ where wages are determined independently at the firm-level, (2)...

We provide a simple framework to analyse the effect of firm dominance on incentives for R&D. An increase in firm dominance, which we measure by a premium in consumer valuation, increases the dominant firm's incentives and decreases the rival firm's incentives for R&D. These changes influence the...

Using a game theoretical model on firms' simultaneous investments in product and process innovation, we deduct and empirically test hypotheses on the optimal R&D portfolio, investment, performance, and dynamic efficiency of R&D for acquisitions and in independently competing firms. We use...