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Bargaining, Mergers and Technology Choice in Bilaterally Oligopolistic Industries

Inderst, Roman; Wey, Christian - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

This Paper provides a conceptual framework of multilateral bargaining in a bilaterally oligopolistic industry to analyse the motivations for horizontal mergers, technology choice, and their welfare implications. We first analyse the implication of market structure for the distribution of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791946

Bertrand Competition in Markets with Network Effects and Switching Costs

Suleymanova, Irina; Wey, Christian - Universität <Berlin, Humboldt-Universität> / … - 2008

. Depending on the ratio of switching costs to network effects, our model generates convergence to monopoly as well as market … switching costs market sharing is the unique equilibrium and for small switching costs both monopoly and market sharing … equilibria emerge. We also analyze stationary and stable equilibria, where we show that a monopoly outcome is almost inevitable …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005863289

How Strong Buyers Spur Upstream Innovation

Inderst, Roman; Wey, Christian - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

We challenge the view that the presence of powerful buyers stifles suppliers' incentives to innovate. Following Katz (1987), we model buyer power as buyers' ability to substitute away from a given supplier and isolate several effects that support the opposite view, namely that the presence of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136445

The Incentives for Takeover in Oligopoly

Inderst, Roman; Wey, Christian - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

This Paper presents a model of takeover incentives in an oligopolistic industry, which, in contrast to previous approaches, takes both insiders' and outsiders' gains from an increase in industry concentration into account. Our main application is to compare takeover incentives in a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136493