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Naked exclusion: Towards a behavioral approach to exclusive dealing

Boone, Jan; Müller, Wieland; Suetens, Sigrid - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We report experimental results on exclusive dealing inspired by the literature on "naked exclusion.'' Our key findings are: First, exclusion of a more efficient entrant is a widespread phenomenon in lab markets. Second, allowing incumbents to discriminate between buyers increases exclusion rates...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004991543

The Distribution of Harm in Price-Fixing Cases

Boone, Jan; Müller, Wieland - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

We consider a vertically related industry and analyze how the total harm due to a price increase upstream is distributed over downstream firms and final consumers. For this purpose, we develop a general model without making specific assumptions regarding demand, costs, or the mode of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666424

Economic Integration and Investment Incentives in Regulated Industries

Auriol, Emmanuelle; Biancini, Sara - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

The paper studies the impact of market integration on investment incentives in non-competitive industries. It distinguishes between investment in transportation and production cost-reducing technologies. Each domestic firm is controlled by a national regulator in a common market made of two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005012490

Government Outsourcing: Public Contracting with Private Monopoly

Auriol, Emmanuelle; Picard, Pierre M - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

The paper studies the impact of government budget constraint in a pure adverse selection problem of monopoly regulation … to regulation is proposed in which firms are free to enter the market and to choose their price and output levels … than traditional regulation where governments commit to both investment and operation cash-flows. This is especially …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067470

A Theory of BOT Concession Contracts

Auriol, Emmanuelle; Picard, Pierre M - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

In this paper, we discuss the choice for build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) concessions when governments and managers do not share the same information regarding the operation characteristics of a facility. We show that larger shadow costs of public funds and larger information asymmetries entice...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008921773

Selective contracting and foreclosure in health care markets

Bijlsma, Michiel; Boone, Jan; Zwart, Gijsbert - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We analyze exclusive contracts between health care providers and insurers in a model where some consumers choose to stay uninsured. In case of a monopoly insurer, exclusion of a provider changes the distribution of consumers who choose not to insure. Although the foreclosed care provider remains...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008491723

Optimal Competition: A Benchmark for Competition Policy

Boone, Jan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

This Paper introduces optimal competition: the best form of competition in an industry that a competition authority can achieve (given the information constraint that it cannot observe firms’ efficiency levels). We show that the optimal competition outcome in an industry becomes more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789187

Can supranational infrastructure regulation compensate for national institutional weaknesses?

Auriol, Emmanuelle; Estache, Antonio; Wren-Lewis, Liam - 2017

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673406

Selling to Consumers with Endogenous Types

Boone, Jan; Shapiro, Joel - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

For many goods (such as experience goods or addictive goods), consumers' preferences may change over time. In this paper, we examine a monopolist's optimal pricing schedule when current consumption can affect a consumer's valuation in the future and valuations are unobservable. We assume that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497874

Public Procurement and Rent-Seeking: The Case of Paraguay

Auriol, Emmanuelle; Flochel, Thomas; Straub, Stéphane - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

A model of entrepreneurial choices in an economy with a corrupt public procurement sector is built, providing predictions along two main dimensions. First, corruption is more frequent in sectors where public institutions are large buyers. Second, firms favoured with corrupt contracts enjoy extra...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008865969