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Exclusive dealing: the interaction between foreclosure and investment promotion

Fumagalli, Chiara; Motta, Massimo; Rønde, Thomas - 2009

This paper studies a model where exclusive dealing (ED) can both promote investment and foreclose a more efficient supplier. While investment promotion is usually regarded as a pro-competitive effect of ED, our paper shows that it may be the very reason why a contract that forecloses a more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008840035

Exclusive dealing: the interaction between foreclosure and investment promotion

Fumagalli, Chiara; Motta, Massimo; Rønde, Thomas - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789156

Exclusive Dealing and Entry, when Buyers Compete

Fumagalli, Chiara; Motta, Massimo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

Rasmusen et al. (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000) show that an incumbent monopolist might exclude entry of a more efficient competitor, by exploiting externalities among buyers. We show that their results hold only when downstream competition among buyers does not exist or is weak enough....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791363

Economic Integration and Investment Incentives in Regulated Industries

Auriol, Emmanuelle; Biancini, Sara - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

The paper studies the impact of market integration on investment incentives in non-competitive industries. It distinguishes between investment in transportation and production cost-reducing technologies. Each domestic firm is controlled by a national regulator in a common market made of two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005012490

Government Outsourcing: Public Contracting with Private Monopoly

Auriol, Emmanuelle; Picard, Pierre M - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

The paper studies the impact of government budget constraint in a pure adverse selection problem of monopoly regulation … to regulation is proposed in which firms are free to enter the market and to choose their price and output levels … than traditional regulation where governments commit to both investment and operation cash-flows. This is especially …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067470

A Theory of BOT Concession Contracts

Auriol, Emmanuelle; Picard, Pierre M - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

In this paper, we discuss the choice for build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) concessions when governments and managers do not share the same information regarding the operation characteristics of a facility. We show that larger shadow costs of public funds and larger information asymmetries entice...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008921773

Can supranational infrastructure regulation compensate for national institutional weaknesses?

Auriol, Emmanuelle; Estache, Antonio; Wren-Lewis, Liam - 2017

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673406

A simple theory of predation

Fumagalli, Chiara; Motta, Massimo - 2010

We propose a simple theory of predatory pricing, based on scale economies and sequential buyers (or markets). The entrant (or prey) needs to reach a critical scale to be successful. The incumbent (or predator) is ready to make losses on earlier buyers so as to deprive the prey of the scale it...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008702303

A Simple Theory of Predation

Fumagalli, Chiara; Motta, Massimo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004973970

Public Procurement and Rent-Seeking: The Case of Paraguay

Auriol, Emmanuelle; Flochel, Thomas; Straub, Stéphane - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

A model of entrepreneurial choices in an economy with a corrupt public procurement sector is built, providing predictions along two main dimensions. First, corruption is more frequent in sectors where public institutions are large buyers. Second, firms favoured with corrupt contracts enjoy extra...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008865969