Similar Search Results

Competition and Industry Structure for International Rail Transportation

Friebel, Guido; Ivaldi, Marc; Pouyet, Jérôme - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

This paper investigates various options for the organization of the railway industry when network operators require the access to multiple national networks to provide international (freight or passenger) transport services. The EU rail system provides a framework for our analysis....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009207524

Economic Integration and Investment Incentives in Regulated Industries

Auriol, Emmanuelle; Biancini, Sara - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

The paper studies the impact of market integration on investment incentives in non-competitive industries. It distinguishes between investment in transportation and production cost-reducing technologies. Each domestic firm is controlled by a national regulator in a common market made of two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005012490

Government Outsourcing: Public Contracting with Private Monopoly

Auriol, Emmanuelle; Picard, Pierre M - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

The paper studies the impact of government budget constraint in a pure adverse selection problem of monopoly regulation … to regulation is proposed in which firms are free to enter the market and to choose their price and output levels … than traditional regulation where governments commit to both investment and operation cash-flows. This is especially …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067470

Subadditivity Tests for Network Separation with an Application to US Railroads

Ivaldi, Marc; McCullough, Gerard - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

zero output values without losing its flexibility properties. The tests shed light on the respective roles of regulation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067525

A Theory of BOT Concession Contracts

Auriol, Emmanuelle; Picard, Pierre M - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

In this paper, we discuss the choice for build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) concessions when governments and managers do not share the same information regarding the operation characteristics of a facility. We show that larger shadow costs of public funds and larger information asymmetries entice...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008921773

The Social Cost of Air Traffic Delays

de Villemeur, Etienne; Ivaldi, Marc; Quinet, Emile; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

The so-called buffer time or buffer delay allows airlines to control for excessive delays by introducing extra time in their schedule in addition to what is technically required. . We study the differences between unregulated markets - where airlines are free to fix their buffer times...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011165671

Can supranational infrastructure regulation compensate for national institutional weaknesses?

Auriol, Emmanuelle; Estache, Antonio; Wren-Lewis, Liam - 2017

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673406

Public Procurement and Rent-Seeking: The Case of Paraguay

Auriol, Emmanuelle; Flochel, Thomas; Straub, Stéphane - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

A model of entrepreneurial choices in an economy with a corrupt public procurement sector is built, providing predictions along two main dimensions. First, corruption is more frequent in sectors where public institutions are large buyers. Second, firms favoured with corrupt contracts enjoy extra...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008865969

Travel Demand Model with Heterogeneous Users and Endogenous Congestion: An application to optimal pricing of bus services

Batarce, Marco; Ivaldi, Marc - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

We formulate and estimate a structural model for travel demand, in which users have heterogeneous preferences and make their transport decisions considering the network congestion. A key component in the model is that users have incomplete information about the preferences of other users in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009493565

Contract Choice, Incentives, and Political Capture in the Public Sector

Gagnepain, Philippe; Ivaldi, Marc - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

estimate simultaneously the contract choice by the authorities and the effect of regulation on the cost-reducing activity of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008684677