Similar Search Results

Exclusive dealing: the interaction between foreclosure and investment promotion

Fumagalli, Chiara; Motta, Massimo; Rønde, Thomas - 2009

This paper studies a model where exclusive dealing (ED) can both promote investment and foreclose a more efficient supplier. While investment promotion is usually regarded as a pro-competitive effect of ED, our paper shows that it may be the very reason why a contract that forecloses a more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008840035

Exclusive dealing: the interaction between foreclosure and investment promotion

Fumagalli, Chiara; Motta, Massimo; Rønde, Thomas - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789156

Exclusive Dealing and Entry, when Buyers Compete

Fumagalli, Chiara; Motta, Massimo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

Rasmusen et al. (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000) show that an incumbent monopolist might exclude entry of a more efficient competitor, by exploiting externalities among buyers. We show that their results hold only when downstream competition among buyers does not exist or is weak enough....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791363

Economic Integration and Investment Incentives in Regulated Industries

Auriol, Emmanuelle; Biancini, Sara - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

The paper studies the impact of market integration on investment incentives in non-competitive industries. It distinguishes between investment in transportation and production cost-reducing technologies. Each domestic firm is controlled by a national regulator in a common market made of two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005012490

Government Outsourcing: Public Contracting with Private Monopoly

Auriol, Emmanuelle; Picard, Pierre M - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

The paper studies the impact of government budget constraint in a pure adverse selection problem of monopoly regulation … to regulation is proposed in which firms are free to enter the market and to choose their price and output levels … than traditional regulation where governments commit to both investment and operation cash-flows. This is especially …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067470

A Theory of BOT Concession Contracts

Auriol, Emmanuelle; Picard, Pierre M - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

In this paper, we discuss the choice for build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) concessions when governments and managers do not share the same information regarding the operation characteristics of a facility. We show that larger shadow costs of public funds and larger information asymmetries entice...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008921773

Advertising Bans

Motta, Massimo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997

This paper shows that an advertising ban is more likely to increase – rather than decrease – total consumption when advertising does not bring about a large expansion of market demand at given prices and when it increases product differentiation (thus allowing firms to command higher...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656386

Exclusionary Pricing and Rebates When Scale Matters

Karlinger, Liliane; Motta, Massimo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

We consider an incumbent firm and a more efficient entrant, both offering a network good to several asymmetric buyers. The incumbent disposes of an installed base, while the entrant has a network of size zero at the outset, and needs to attract a critical mass of buyers to operate. We analyze...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497963

Vertical Exclusion with Endogenous Competiton Externalities

Hansen, Stephen; Motta, Massimo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

In a vertical market in which downstream firms have private information about their productivity and compete for consumers, an upstream firm posts public bilateral contracts. When downstream firms are risk-neutral without wealth constraints, the upstream firm offers the input to all retailers....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083463

Can supranational infrastructure regulation compensate for national institutional weaknesses?

Auriol, Emmanuelle; Estache, Antonio; Wren-Lewis, Liam - 2017

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673406