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Economic Integration and Investment Incentives in Regulated Industries

Auriol, Emmanuelle; Biancini, Sara - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

The paper studies the impact of market integration on investment incentives in non-competitive industries. It distinguishes between investment in transportation and production cost-reducing technologies. Each domestic firm is controlled by a national regulator in a common market made of two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005012490

Government Outsourcing: Public Contracting with Private Monopoly

Auriol, Emmanuelle; Picard, Pierre M - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

The paper studies the impact of government budget constraint in a pure adverse selection problem of monopoly regulation … to regulation is proposed in which firms are free to enter the market and to choose their price and output levels … than traditional regulation where governments commit to both investment and operation cash-flows. This is especially …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067470

A Theory of BOT Concession Contracts

Auriol, Emmanuelle; Picard, Pierre M - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

In this paper, we discuss the choice for build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) concessions when governments and managers do not share the same information regarding the operation characteristics of a facility. We show that larger shadow costs of public funds and larger information asymmetries entice...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008921773

Can supranational infrastructure regulation compensate for national institutional weaknesses?

Auriol, Emmanuelle; Estache, Antonio; Wren-Lewis, Liam - 2017

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673406

Public Procurement and Rent-Seeking: The Case of Paraguay

Auriol, Emmanuelle; Flochel, Thomas; Straub, Stéphane - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

A model of entrepreneurial choices in an economy with a corrupt public procurement sector is built, providing predictions along two main dimensions. First, corruption is more frequent in sectors where public institutions are large buyers. Second, firms favoured with corrupt contracts enjoy extra...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008865969

Multitasking, Quality and Pay for Performance

Kaarboe, Oddvar Martin; Siciliani, Luigi - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

We present a model of optimal contracting between a purchaser and a provider of health services when quality has two dimensions. We assume that one dimension of quality is verifiable (dimension 1) and one dimension is not verifiable (dimension 2). We show that the power of the incentive scheme...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791404

Performance Indicators for Quality with Adverse Selection, Gaming and Inequality Aversion

Kuhn, Michael; Siciliani, Luigi - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

Performance indicators are increasingly used to regulate quality in health care and other areas of the public sector. We develop a model of contracting between a purchaser (principal) and a provider (agent) under the following scenarios: a) higher ability increases quality directly and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123654

Sale of Visas: A Smuggler's Final Song?

Auriol, Emmanuelle; Mesnard, Alice - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

We study how smugglers respond to different types of migration policies - legalisation through the sale of migration visas, or more traditional repressive policies through borders' enforcement, employers' sanctions or deportation - by changing the price they propose to illegal migrants. In this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083587

Optimal Price-Setting in Pay for Performance Schemes in Health Care

Rud Kristensen, Søren; Siciliani, Luigi; Sutton, Matt - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

The increased availability of process measures implies that quality of care is in some areas de facto verifiable. Optimal price-setting for verifiable quality is well-described in the incentive-design literature. We seek to narrow the large gap between actual price-setting behaviour in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084045

Paying for Performance with Altruistic or Motivated Providers

Siciliani, Luigi - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

We present a model of optimal contracting between a purchaser (a principal) and a provider (an agent). We assume that: a) providers differ in efficiency and there are two types of provider; b) efficiency is private information (adverse selection); c) providers are partially altruistic or...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661600