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Endogenous Contracts Under Bargaining in Competing Vertical Chains

Milliou, Chrysovalantou; Petrakis, Emmanuel; Vettas, … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

We investigate the endogenous determination of contracts in competing vertical chains where upstream and downstream firms bargain first over the type of contract and then over the contract terms. Upstream firms always opt for non-linear contracts, which specify the input quantity and its total...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123524

On Intrabrand and Interbrand Competition: The Strategic Role of Fees and Royalties

Saggi, Kamal; Vettas, Nikolaos - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

We examine oligopolistic markets with both intrabrand and interbrand competition. We characterize equilibrium contracts involving a royalty (or wholesale price) and a fee when each upstream firm contracts with multiple downstream firms. Royalties control competition between own downstream firms...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067481

Too Many or Too Few Varieties? The Role of Multiproduct Firms

Caminal, Ramon - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

The goal of this paper is to examine the role of multiproduct firms in the market provision of product diversity. The analysis is conducted within the spatial model of nonlocalized competition proposed by Chen and Riordan (2006). It turns out that the effect of multiproduct firms on product...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123835

Dynamic Product Diversity

Caminal, Ramon - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

The goal of this paper is to study the frequency of new product introductions in monopoly markets where demand is subject to transitory saturation. We focus on those types of goods for which consumers purchase at most one unit of each variety, but repeat purchases in the same product category....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083697

The design and efficiency of loyalty rewards

Caminal, Ramon - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

The goal of this paper is to reexamine the optimal design and efficiency of loyalty rewards in markets for final consumption goods. While the literature has emphasized the role of loyalty rewards as endogenous switching costs (which distort the efficient allocation of consumers), in this paper I...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008458297

Efficiency Gains and Structural Remedies in Merger Control

Vasconcelos, Helder - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

This paper studies the role of structural remedies in merger control in a Cournot setting where (endogenous) mergers are motivated by prospective efficiency gains and must be submitted to an Antitrust Authority (AA) which might require partial divestiture for approval. Both positive and negative...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498161

Can the Failing Firm Defense Rule be Counterproductive?

Vasconcelos, Helder - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

This paper studies the role of the failing firm defense (FFD) concept in merger control in a Cournot setting where: (i) endogenous mergers are motivated by prospective efficiency gains; and (ii) mergers must be submitted to an Antitrust Authority which might require partial divestiture for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084654

Economic Integration and Investment Incentives in Regulated Industries

Auriol, Emmanuelle; Biancini, Sara - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

The paper studies the impact of market integration on investment incentives in non-competitive industries. It distinguishes between investment in transportation and production cost-reducing technologies. Each domestic firm is controlled by a national regulator in a common market made of two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005012490

Government Outsourcing: Public Contracting with Private Monopoly

Auriol, Emmanuelle; Picard, Pierre M - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

The paper studies the impact of government budget constraint in a pure adverse selection problem of monopoly regulation … to regulation is proposed in which firms are free to enter the market and to choose their price and output levels … than traditional regulation where governments commit to both investment and operation cash-flows. This is especially …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067470

A Theory of BOT Concession Contracts

Auriol, Emmanuelle; Picard, Pierre M - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

In this paper, we discuss the choice for build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) concessions when governments and managers do not share the same information regarding the operation characteristics of a facility. We show that larger shadow costs of public funds and larger information asymmetries entice...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008921773