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Welfare Analysis of Regulating Mobile Termination Rates in the UK (with an Application to the Orange/T-Mobile Merger)

Harbord, David; Hoernig, Steffen - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

This paper presents results from a calibrated welfare model of the UK mobile telephony market which includes many mobile networks; calls to and from the fixed network; networkbased price discrimination; and call externalities. The analysis focuses on the short-run effects of adopting lower...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468563

Endogenous Contracts Under Bargaining in Competing Vertical Chains

Milliou, Chrysovalantou; Petrakis, Emmanuel; Vettas, … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

We investigate the endogenous determination of contracts in competing vertical chains where upstream and downstream firms bargain first over the type of contract and then over the contract terms. Upstream firms always opt for non-linear contracts, which specify the input quantity and its total...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123524

On Intrabrand and Interbrand Competition: The Strategic Role of Fees and Royalties

Saggi, Kamal; Vettas, Nikolaos - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

We examine oligopolistic markets with both intrabrand and interbrand competition. We characterize equilibrium contracts involving a royalty (or wholesale price) and a fee when each upstream firm contracts with multiple downstream firms. Royalties control competition between own downstream firms...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067481

Efficiency Gains and Structural Remedies in Merger Control

Vasconcelos, Helder - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

This paper studies the role of structural remedies in merger control in a Cournot setting where (endogenous) mergers are motivated by prospective efficiency gains and must be submitted to an Antitrust Authority (AA) which might require partial divestiture for approval. Both positive and negative...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498161

Calling Circles: Network Competition with Non-Uniform Calling Patterns

Hoernig, Steffen; Inderst, Roman; Valletti, Tommaso - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

We introduce a flexible model of telecommunications network competition with non-uniform calling patterns, which account for the fact that customers tend to make most calls to a small subset of people. Equilibrium call prices are distorted away from marginal cost, and competitive intensity is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008784708

Competition Between Multiple Asymmetric Networks: Theory and Applications

Hoernig, Steffen - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

We present a tractable model of competition between an arbitrary number of interconnected communications networks in the presence of tariff-mediated network externalities, call externalities, and cost and market share asymmetries. On the theory side, we provide a criterion for stability in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008679877

Tariff-Mediated Network Externalities: Is Regulatory Intervention Any Good?

Hoernig, Steffen - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

Mobile phone networks' practice of charging higher prices for off-net than for on-net calls has been pinpointed as the source of two competition problems: underprovision of calls and permanent disadvantages for small networks. We consider these allegations and four different remedies: limiting...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114399

The Breakdown of Connectivity Breakdowns

Hoernig, Steffen - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

finite call and receiving prices exist for a large and realistic range of call externality values. This allows regulation of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084152

Can the Failing Firm Defense Rule be Counterproductive?

Vasconcelos, Helder - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

This paper studies the role of the failing firm defense (FFD) concept in merger control in a Cournot setting where: (i) endogenous mergers are motivated by prospective efficiency gains; and (ii) mergers must be submitted to an Antitrust Authority which might require partial divestiture for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084654

Asymmetric Broadband Wholesale Regulation

Hoernig, Steffen - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

existing access regulation is based on a single essential network. We show that continued asymmetric access regulation of one … network does not control sufficiently for market power and benefits the unregulated network, and that symmetric regulation … would lead to higher consumer surplus. Furthermore, the whole setup of access regulation may not be viable in the long run …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009024485