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Exclusive dealing: the interaction between foreclosure and investment promotion

Fumagalli, Chiara; Motta, Massimo; Rønde, Thomas - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

This paper studies a model where exclusive dealing (ED) can both promote investment and foreclose a more efficient supplier. While investment promotion is usually regarded as a pro-competitive effect of ED, our paper shows that it may be the very reason why a contract that forecloses a more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789156

Exclusive Dealing and Entry, when Buyers Compete

Fumagalli, Chiara; Motta, Massimo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

Rasmusen et al. (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000) show that an incumbent monopolist might exclude entry of a more efficient competitor, by exploiting externalities among buyers. We show that their results hold only when downstream competition among buyers does not exist or is weak enough....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791363

Strategic Supply Function Competition with Private Information

Vives, Xavier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

A finite number of sellers (n) compete in schedules to supply an elastic demand. The costs of the sellers have uncertain common and private value components and there is no exogenous noise in the system. A Bayesian supply function equilibrium is characterized; the equilibrium is privately...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789071

A Theory of BOT Concession Contracts

Auriol, Emmanuelle; Picard, Pierre M - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

In this paper, we discuss the choice for build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) concessions when governments and managers do not share the same information regarding the operation characteristics of a facility. We show that larger shadow costs of public funds and larger information asymmetries entice...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008921773

Economic Integration and Investment Incentives in Regulated Industries

Auriol, Emmanuelle; Biancini, Sara - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

The paper studies the impact of market integration on investment incentives in non-competitive industries. It distinguishes between investment in transportation and production cost-reducing technologies. Each domestic firm is controlled by a national regulator in a common market made of two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005012490

Government Outsourcing: Public Contracting with Private Monopoly

Auriol, Emmanuelle; Picard, Pierre M - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

The paper studies the impact of government budget constraint in a pure adverse selection problem of monopoly regulation … to regulation is proposed in which firms are free to enter the market and to choose their price and output levels … than traditional regulation where governments commit to both investment and operation cash-flows. This is especially …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067470

Advertising Bans

Motta, Massimo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997

This paper shows that an advertising ban is more likely to increase – rather than decrease – total consumption when advertising does not bring about a large expansion of market demand at given prices and when it increases product differentiation (thus allowing firms to command higher...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656386

Vertical Exclusion with Endogenous Competiton Externalities

Hansen, Stephen; Motta, Massimo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

In a vertical market in which downstream firms have private information about their productivity and compete for consumers, an upstream firm posts public bilateral contracts. When downstream firms are risk-neutral without wealth constraints, the upstream firm offers the input to all retailers....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083463

Exclusionary Pricing and Rebates When Scale Matters

Karlinger, Liliane; Motta, Massimo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

We consider an incumbent firm and a more efficient entrant, both offering a network good to several asymmetric buyers. The incumbent disposes of an installed base, while the entrant has a network of size zero at the outset, and needs to attract a critical mass of buyers to operate. We analyze...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497963

Excess Entry, Vertical Integration and Welfare

Kühn, Kai-Uwe; Vives, Xavier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1995

This paper provides a systematic analysis of the welfare effects of vertical integration by a monopolistic input supplier into a monopolistically competitive downstream industry. We give sufficient conditions on consumer preferences that lead to Pareto improving vertical integration. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661460