Rolle eines Clustermanagements zur Erzielung von Kooperationserfolg in Clustern -- Relationale Quellen als Basis zur Erzielung von Clustererfolg -- Koordinationsmechanismen zur Aktivierung relationaler Quellen in Clustern -- Handlungsempfehlungen für Clusterakteure. .

Economic agents are not always rational or farsighted and can make decisions according to simple behavioral rules that vary according to situation and can be studied using the tools of evolutionary game theory. Furthermore, such behavioral rules are themselves subject to evolutionary forces....

We consider an evolutionary model of social coordination in a 2 × 2 game where two groups of players prefer to coordinate on different actions. Players can pay a cost to learn their opponent's group: if they pay it, they can condition their actions concerning the groups. We assess the stability...

We analyze a model in which individuals have hereditary reproductive types. The reproductive value of an individual is determined by her reproductive type and the amount of resources she can access. We introduce the possibility of suicide and assume it is also a genetic trait that interacts with...