We develop a theory of innovation for entry and sale into oligopoly, and show that an invention of higher quality is …

We show that when the researcher’s (observable but not contractible) contribution to innovation is crucial, a covenant …

paper, we analyze a two-stage innovation game between one incumbent and a large number of entrants. In the first stage … innovation. In the second stage, successful entrants bid to be acquired by the incumbent. We assume that entrants cannot survive …&D approaches than the incumbent and are more likely to generate the highest value innovation. Thus, the need of entrants to be …

entrepreneurs’ choice of riskiness (quality) of an innovation project, and on their mode of commercializing the innovation (market …

option of selling to an incumbent increases innovation incentives for entrepreneurs when network effects are strong and … necessarily restrict innovation incentives. We also show that network effects promote acquisitions over entry and that the … entrepreneur has strong incentives to invest in the initial user base of the innovation. …

simple model of cumulative innovation is presented where technology spillovers arise endogenously through labour mobility. It … to develop an innovation is neither very high nor very low. Trade secret protection based on punitive damages is, except …

more likely in situations where the innovation step is large and the probability for a firm to be the only innovator is …