We describe firm pricing when consumers search passively and follow simple reservation price rules. In stark contrast to other models in the literature, this approach yields equilib- rium price dispersion in pure strategies even when firms have the same marginal costs. In equilibrium, lower...

We analyze an oligopoly model with horizontal di¤erentiation and quality di¤erences. High quality goods are over-priced and under-produced. When the market is fairly covered, low quality products may be pro…table when their social contribution is negative, leading to too many products in...

Advertising messages compete for scarce attention. ?Junk? mail, ?spam? e-mail, and telemarketing calls need both parties to exert effort to generate transactions. Message recipients supply attention depending on average message beneÞt. Senders are motivated by proÞts. Costlier message...

We revisit the fundamental issue of market provision of variety associated with Chamberlin, Spence, and Dixit and Stiglitz when firms sell several products. Both products and firms are envisaged as di?erentiated. We propose a nested demand model where consumers decide upon a firm then which...

We describe firm pricing when consumers follow simple reservation price rules. In stark contrast to other models in the literature, this approach yields price dispersion in pure strategies even when firms have the same marginal costs. At the equilibrium, lower price firms earn higher profits....