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Entrepreneurial Innovations, Entrepreneurship Policy and Globalization

Douhan, Robin; Norbäck, Pehr-Johan; Persson, Lars - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

What explains the world-wide trend of pro-entrepreneurial policies? We study entrepreneurial policy in a lobbying model taking into account the conflict of interest between entrepreneurs and incumbents. It is shown that international market integration leads to more pro-entrepreneurial policies....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008530366

Welfare Analysis of Regulating Mobile Termination Rates in the UK (with an Application to the Orange/T-Mobile Merger)

Harbord, David; Hoernig, Steffen - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

This paper presents results from a calibrated welfare model of the UK mobile telephony market which includes many mobile networks; calls to and from the fixed network; networkbased price discrimination; and call externalities. The analysis focuses on the short-run effects of adopting lower...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468563

Calling Circles: Network Competition with Non-Uniform Calling Patterns

Hoernig, Steffen; Inderst, Roman; Valletti, Tommaso - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

We introduce a flexible model of telecommunications network competition with non-uniform calling patterns, which account for the fact that customers tend to make most calls to a small subset of people. Equilibrium call prices are distorted away from marginal cost, and competitive intensity is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008784708

Competition Between Multiple Asymmetric Networks: Theory and Applications

Hoernig, Steffen - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

We present a tractable model of competition between an arbitrary number of interconnected communications networks in the presence of tariff-mediated network externalities, call externalities, and cost and market share asymmetries. On the theory side, we provide a criterion for stability in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008679877

Tariff-Mediated Network Externalities: Is Regulatory Intervention Any Good?

Hoernig, Steffen - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

Mobile phone networks' practice of charging higher prices for off-net than for on-net calls has been pinpointed as the source of two competition problems: underprovision of calls and permanent disadvantages for small networks. We consider these allegations and four different remedies: limiting...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114399

The Breakdown of Connectivity Breakdowns

Hoernig, Steffen - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

finite call and receiving prices exist for a large and realistic range of call externality values. This allows regulation of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084152

Asymmetric Broadband Wholesale Regulation

Hoernig, Steffen - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

existing access regulation is based on a single essential network. We show that continued asymmetric access regulation of one … network does not control sufficiently for market power and benefits the unregulated network, and that symmetric regulation … would lead to higher consumer surplus. Furthermore, the whole setup of access regulation may not be viable in the long run …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009024485

Acquisitions, Entry, and Innovation in Network Industries

Norbäck, Pehr-Johan; Persson, Lars; Tåg, Joacim Ingemar - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

In industries with network effects, incumbents’ installed bases create barriers to entry that discourage entrepreneurs from developing new innovations. Yet, entry is not the only commercialization route for entrepreneurs. We show that the option of selling to an incumbent increases innovation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083667

Sectoral Regulators and the Competition Authority: Which Relationship is Best?

Barros, Pedro Pita; Hoernig, Steffen - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

Inspired by the creation of the new Competition Authority in Portugal, we consider the interplay between regulatory agencies with overlapping competencies; for example, a competition authority and a sectoral regulator. We analyse how authorities’ incentives are affected if they can decide...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662069

Keeping Both Eyes Wide Open: The Life of a Competition Authority Among Sectoral Regulators

Barros, Pedro Luis Pita; Hoernig, Steffen; Nilssen, Tore - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

Competition authorities must pay attention to many industries simultaneously. Sectoral regulators concentrate on their own industry. Often both types of authority may intervene in specific industries and there is an overlap of jurisdictions. We show how a competition authority’s resource...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789047