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Capacity Choices in Liberalized Electricity Markets

Castro-Rodriguez, Fidel; Uribe, Marín; Luis, Pedro; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

absence of any regulation, private investment decisions on capacity unambiguously lead to a socially sub-optimal outcome, and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792333

Exclusive Contracts and Market Power: Evidence from Ocean Shipping

Uribe, Marín; Luis, Pedro - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

There is a substantial theoretical literature on the potential effects of loyalty contracts, but a relative paucity of empirical work. This Paper employs the event study methodology to examine the effect of exclusionary contracts on firm performance in the ocean shipping industry. Shipping...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497855

Coordination and Lock-In: Competition with Switching Costs and Network Effects

Farrell, Joseph; Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

Switching costs and network effects bind customers to vendors if products are incompatible, locking customers or even markets in to early choices. Lock-in hinders customers from changing suppliers in response to (predictable or unpredictable) changes in efficiency, and gives vendors lucrative ex...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124423

Strategic Bidding in Electricity Pools with Short-Lived Bids: An Application to the Spanish Market

García-Díaz, Antón; Uribe, Marín; Luis, Pedro - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

We generalize von der Fehr and Harbord's (1993) multi-unit auction model for the case of a deterministic demand allowing for any technology mix and elastic demand in order to account for demand side bidding. We obtain a general characterization of the equilibrium and show that the Cournot model...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789069

Why every Economist should Learn some Auction Theory

Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

This is a preliminary draft of an Invited Symposium paper for the World Congress of the Econometric Society to be held in Seattle in August 2000. We discuss the strong connections between auction theory and 'standard' economic theory, and argue that auction-theoretic tools and intuitions can...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792157

Regulation and Incentives in European Aviation

Gagnepain, Philippe; Uribe, Marín; Luis, Pedro - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

The aim of this Paper is to evaluate simultaneously market power and the incentives faced by carriers to improve efficiency, taking into account the regulatory changes that have affected the European airline industry. We construct and estimate a model that includes demand, capacity, and cost...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005667136

Regulation and Supervision : An Ethical Perspective

Kane, Edward J. - 2008

This essay shows that government credit-allocation schemes generate incentive conflicts that undermine the quality of bank supervision and eventually produce banking crisis. For political reasons, most countries establish a regulatory culture that embraces three economically contradictory...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012772313

Ethical Foundations of Financial Regulation

Kane, Edward J. - 2008

Regulation consists of rulemaking and enforcement. Economic theory offers two complementary rationales for regulating … arise in multi- party relationships and that regulation introduces opportunities to impose rules that enhance the welfare of … discretion and choose actions for the common good. Agency-cost theories portray regulation as a way to raise the quality of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012774887

Using Deferred Compensation to Strengthen the Ethicsof Financial Regulation

Kane, Edward J. - 2001

Defects in the corporate governance of government-owned enterprises tempt opportunistic officials to breach duties of public stewardship. Corporate-governance theory suggests that incentive-based deferred compensation could intensify the force that common-law duties actually exert on regulatory...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012787637

Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?

Bulow, Jeremy I.; Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We compare the most common methods for selling a company or other asset when participation is costly: a simple simultaneous auction, and a sequential process in which potential buyers decide in turn whether or not to enter the bidding. The sequential process is always more efficient. But...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004976795