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Capacity Choices in Liberalized Electricity Markets

Castro-Rodriguez, Fidel; Uribe, Marín; Luis, Pedro; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

absence of any regulation, private investment decisions on capacity unambiguously lead to a socially sub-optimal outcome, and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792333

Exclusive Contracts and Market Power: Evidence from Ocean Shipping

Uribe, Marín; Luis, Pedro - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

There is a substantial theoretical literature on the potential effects of loyalty contracts, but a relative paucity of empirical work. This Paper employs the event study methodology to examine the effect of exclusionary contracts on firm performance in the ocean shipping industry. Shipping...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497855

Strategic Bidding in Electricity Pools with Short-Lived Bids: An Application to the Spanish Market

García-Díaz, Antón; Uribe, Marín; Luis, Pedro - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

We generalize von der Fehr and Harbord's (1993) multi-unit auction model for the case of a deterministic demand allowing for any technology mix and elastic demand in order to account for demand side bidding. We obtain a general characterization of the equilibrium and show that the Cournot model...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789069

Regulation and Incentives in European Aviation

Gagnepain, Philippe; Uribe, Marín; Luis, Pedro - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

The aim of this Paper is to evaluate simultaneously market power and the incentives faced by carriers to improve efficiency, taking into account the regulatory changes that have affected the European airline industry. We construct and estimate a model that includes demand, capacity, and cost...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005667136

Regulation and Supervision : An Ethical Perspective

Kane, Edward J. - 2008

This essay shows that government credit-allocation schemes generate incentive conflicts that undermine the quality of bank supervision and eventually produce banking crisis. For political reasons, most countries establish a regulatory culture that embraces three economically contradictory...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012772313

Ethical Foundations of Financial Regulation

Kane, Edward J. - 2008

Regulation consists of rulemaking and enforcement. Economic theory offers two complementary rationales for regulating … arise in multi- party relationships and that regulation introduces opportunities to impose rules that enhance the welfare of … discretion and choose actions for the common good. Agency-cost theories portray regulation as a way to raise the quality of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012774887

Using Deferred Compensation to Strengthen the Ethicsof Financial Regulation

Kane, Edward J. - 2001

Defects in the corporate governance of government-owned enterprises tempt opportunistic officials to breach duties of public stewardship. Corporate-governance theory suggests that incentive-based deferred compensation could intensify the force that common-law duties actually exert on regulatory...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012787637

Multilateral Subsidy Games

Leahy, Dermot; Neary, J Peter - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

This paper examines the rationale for multilateral agreements to limit investment subsidies. The welfare ranking of symmetric multilateral subsidy games is shown to depend on whether or not investment levels are "friendly", raising rival profits in total, and/or strategic complements, raising...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662067

Alliances in the Air: Some Worldwide Evidence

Gagnepain, Philippe; Uribe, Marín; Luis, Pedro - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

We consider an empirical model of worldwide airlines’ alliances that we apply to a large set of companies for the period 1995-2000, with special attention to US and EU carriers. From the estimation of a cost, capacity and demand system that accounts for cross-price elasticities, we attempt to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666444

International R&D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy without Government Commitment

Leahy, Dermot; Neary, J Peter - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1995

We examine optimal industrial and trade policies in a series of dynamic oligopoly games in which a home and a foreign firm compete in R&D and output. Alternative assumptions about the timing of moves and the ability of agents to commit intertemporally are considered. We show that the home export...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666646