Similar Search Results

Capacity Choices in Liberalized Electricity Markets

Castro-Rodriguez, Fidel; Uribe, Marín; Luis, Pedro; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

absence of any regulation, private investment decisions on capacity unambiguously lead to a socially sub-optimal outcome, and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792333

Exclusive Contracts and Market Power: Evidence from Ocean Shipping

Uribe, Marín; Luis, Pedro - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

There is a substantial theoretical literature on the potential effects of loyalty contracts, but a relative paucity of empirical work. This Paper employs the event study methodology to examine the effect of exclusionary contracts on firm performance in the ocean shipping industry. Shipping...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497855

Strategic Bidding in Electricity Pools with Short-Lived Bids: An Application to the Spanish Market

García-Díaz, Antón; Uribe, Marín; Luis, Pedro - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

We generalize von der Fehr and Harbord's (1993) multi-unit auction model for the case of a deterministic demand allowing for any technology mix and elastic demand in order to account for demand side bidding. We obtain a general characterization of the equilibrium and show that the Cournot model...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789069

Regulation and Incentives in European Aviation

Gagnepain, Philippe; Uribe, Marín; Luis, Pedro - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

The aim of this Paper is to evaluate simultaneously market power and the incentives faced by carriers to improve efficiency, taking into account the regulatory changes that have affected the European airline industry. We construct and estimate a model that includes demand, capacity, and cost...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005667136

Exclusive Contracts, Loss to Delay and Incentives to Invest

Groh, Christian; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

We model a new effect of exclusivity on non-contractible investments in buyer/seller relationships. By restricting the buyer to purchase from only one seller, exclusivity increases the buyer’s costs of haggling during renegotiation and hence the seller’s relative bargaining power and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497871

Regulation and Supervision : An Ethical Perspective

Kane, Edward J. - 2008

This essay shows that government credit-allocation schemes generate incentive conflicts that undermine the quality of bank supervision and eventually produce banking crisis. For political reasons, most countries establish a regulatory culture that embraces three economically contradictory...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012772313

Ethical Foundations of Financial Regulation

Kane, Edward J. - 2008

Regulation consists of rulemaking and enforcement. Economic theory offers two complementary rationales for regulating … arise in multi- party relationships and that regulation introduces opportunities to impose rules that enhance the welfare of … discretion and choose actions for the common good. Agency-cost theories portray regulation as a way to raise the quality of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012774887

Using Deferred Compensation to Strengthen the Ethicsof Financial Regulation

Kane, Edward J. - 2001

Defects in the corporate governance of government-owned enterprises tempt opportunistic officials to breach duties of public stewardship. Corporate-governance theory suggests that incentive-based deferred compensation could intensify the force that common-law duties actually exert on regulatory...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012787637

Leniency Policies and Illegal Transactions

Buccirossi, Paolo; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

We study the consequences of leniency - reduced legal sanctions for wrongdoers who spontaneously self-report to law enforcers - on sequential, bilateral, illegal transactions such as corruption, manager-auditor collusion, or drug deals. It is known that leniency helps to deter illegal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124229

Legalizing Bribe Giving

Dufwenberg, Martin; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

A model of harassment bribes (paid for services one is entitled to) is developed and used to analyze the recent proposal to legalize paying bribes while increasing fines on accepting bribes. We explore performance as regards corruption deterrence and public service provision. A modified scheme,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083969