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Regulation and Supervision : An Ethical Perspective

Kane, Edward J. - 2008

This essay shows that government credit-allocation schemes generate incentive conflicts that undermine the quality of bank supervision and eventually produce banking crisis. For political reasons, most countries establish a regulatory culture that embraces three economically contradictory...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012772313

Ethical Foundations of Financial Regulation

Kane, Edward J. - 2008

Regulation consists of rulemaking and enforcement. Economic theory offers two complementary rationales for regulating … arise in multi- party relationships and that regulation introduces opportunities to impose rules that enhance the welfare of … discretion and choose actions for the common good. Agency-cost theories portray regulation as a way to raise the quality of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012774887

Safety-Net Benefits Conferred on Difficult-to-Fail-And-Unwind Banks in the Us and EU Before and During the Great Recession

Carbo-Valverde, Santiago - 2011

This paper models and estimates ex ante safety-net benefits at a sample of large banks in US and Europe during 2003-2008. Our results suggest that difficult-to-fail and unwind (DFU) banks enjoyed substantially higher ex ante benefits than other institutions. Safety-net benefits prove...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013130253

Evidence of Regulatory Arbitrage in Cross-Border Mergers of Banks in the EU

Carbo-Valverde, Santiago - 2010

Banks are in the business of taking calculated risks. Expanding the geographic footprint of an organization's profit-making activities changes the geographic pattern of its exposure to loss in ways that are hard for regulators and supervisors to observe. This paper tests and confirms the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013150440

Can the European Community Afford to Neglect the Need for More Accountable Safety-Net Management?

Kane, Edward J. - 2010

As financial institutions and markets transact more and more cross-border business, gaps and flaws in national safety nets become more consequential. Because citizens of host (home) countries may be made to pay for mistakes made in the home (host) country, Basel's lead-regulator paradigm...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012761789