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An inventor can invest research effort to come up with an innovation. Once an innovation is made, a contract is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084016
of Central Florida in Regional Economic Development -- The impact of technological acquisitions on innovation and quality … property rights in the biotechnology industry -- External technology supply and client-side innovation -- The Enrolment in an R …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014016405
Chapter 1 Introduction -- Chapter 2 Motivating Entrepreneurship and Innovation Activity -- Chapter 3 Publicly Funded … Principal Investigators as Transformative Agents of Public Sector Entrepreneurship -- Chapter 4 An Innovation Policy Framework … -- Chapter 5 Radical and Incremental Innovation and the Role of University Scientist. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014018873
Future -- The Entrepreneurial Process -- Risk and Uncertainty -- Innovation and Technological Change -- Market Processes and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014013953
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013521051
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013521052
An upstream firm can license its innovation to downstream firms that have to exert further development effort. There …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497972
We study a two-period moral hazard problem with risk-neutral and wealth-constrained agents and three identical tasks. We show that the allocation of tasks over time is important if there is a capacity constraint on the number of tasks that can be performed in one period. We characterize the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067477
We explore the dynamic evolution of property rights regimes in R&D alliances using the incomplete contract approach pioneered by Grossman, Hart and Moore (Hart and Moore, Journal of Political Economy (1990), and Grossman and Hart, Journal of Political Economy (1986)). In contrast to the standard...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067424
This paper discusses the optimal organization of sequential agency problems with contractible control actions under limited liability. In each of two stages, a risk-neutral agent can choose an unobservable effort level. A success in the first stage makes effort in the second stage more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791951