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Cabral, Luís M B; Cozzi, Guido; Denicolò, Vincenzo; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

potential suppliers generate and sell the most suitable innovation. Moreover, procurement by public agencies and large firms … the degree of competition between suppliers, as well as other more practical indirect ways to stimulate innovation. We … discuss the effects of standard setting activities by large, often public, procurers on innovation races. We evaluate how …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791875

The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability

Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

An inventor can invest research effort to come up with an innovation. Once an innovation is made, a contract is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084016

Entry Mistakes

Cabral, Luís M B - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997

Frequently, aspiring entrants have only limited information about their potential rivals’ entry decisions. As a result, the outcome of the entry game may be that more firms enter than the market can sustain; or, at least, that unnecessary entry investments are made. We refer to these outcomes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662244

Exclusive versus Non-exclusive Licensing Strategies and Moral Hazard

Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

An upstream firm can license its innovation to downstream firms that have to exert further development effort. There …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497972

Does Microsoft Stifle Innovation? Dominant Firms, Imitation and R&D Incentives

Cabral, Luís M B; Polak, Ben - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

firm's incentives for R&D. These changes influence the probability of innovation through two effects: changes in total R … shift from the rival firm to the dominant firm is a good thing as it decreases the likelihood of duplicate innovation (we … rights are strong. That is, firm dominance is good for innovation when (but only when) property rights are strong. We also …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789049

Task Scheduling and Moral Hazard

Mylovanov, Tymofiy; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

We study a two-period moral hazard problem with risk-neutral and wealth-constrained agents and three identical tasks. We show that the allocation of tasks over time is important if there is a capacity constraint on the number of tasks that can be performed in one period. We characterize the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067477

R&D Alliances as Non-cooperative Supergames

Cabral, Luís M B - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1996

R&D alliances (Research Joint Ventures or other institutional forms) normally involve repeated, non-contractible actions (investments in R&D), and uncertainty regarding both success and the termination date. Accordingly, we model these agreements as equilibria of infinite-period supergames. Our...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136561

Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights in Dynamic R&D Alliances

Rosenkranz, Stephanie; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

We explore the dynamic evolution of property rights regimes in R&D alliances using the incomplete contract approach pioneered by Grossman, Hart and Moore (Hart and Moore, Journal of Political Economy (1990), and Grossman and Hart, Journal of Political Economy (1986)). In contrast to the standard...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067424

Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions

Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

This paper discusses the optimal organization of sequential agency problems with contractible control actions under limited liability. In each of two stages, a risk-neutral agent can choose an unobservable effort level. A success in the first stage makes effort in the second stage more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791951