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The Organization of the Innovation Industry: Entrepreneurs, Venture Capitalists and Oligopolists

Norbäck, Pehr-Johan; Persson, Lars - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

Exit of venture-backed firms often takes place through sales to large incumbent firms. We show that in such an environment, venture-backed firms have a stronger incentive to develop basic innovations into commercialized innovations than incumbent firms, due to strategic product market effects....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791605

Creative Destruction and Productive Preemption

Norbäck, Pehr-Johan; Persson, Lars; Svensson, Roger - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

We develop a theory of innovation for entry and sale into oligopoly, and show that an invention of higher quality is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008865973

The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability

Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

An inventor can invest research effort to come up with an innovation. Once an innovation is made, a contract is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084016

Venture Capital, Patenting, and Usefulness of Innovations

Fabrizi, Simona; Lippert, Steffen; Norbäck, Pehr-Johan; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

We analyze incentives to develop entrepreneurial ideas for venture capitalists (VCs) and incumbent firms. If VCs are sufficiently better at judging an idea's value and if it is sufficiently more costly to patent low than high value ideas, VCs acquire valuable ideas, develop them beyond the level...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009643508

Entrepreneurial Innovations, Entrepreneurship Policy and Globalization

Douhan, Robin; Norbäck, Pehr-Johan; Persson, Lars - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

What explains the world-wide trend of pro-entrepreneurial policies? We study entrepreneurial policy in a lobbying model taking into account the conflict of interest between entrepreneurs and incumbents. It is shown that international market integration leads to more pro-entrepreneurial policies....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008530366

Exclusive versus Non-exclusive Licensing Strategies and Moral Hazard

Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

An upstream firm can license its innovation to downstream firms that have to exert further development effort. There …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497972

Entrepreneurial innovations and taxation

Haufler, Andreas; Norbäck, Pehr-Johan; Persson, Lars - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

entrepreneurs’ choice of riskiness (quality) of an innovation project, and on their mode of commercializing the innovation (market …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083431

Acquisitions, Entry, and Innovation in Network Industries

Norbäck, Pehr-Johan; Persson, Lars; Tåg, Joacim Ingemar - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

option of selling to an incumbent increases innovation incentives for entrepreneurs when network effects are strong and … necessarily restrict innovation incentives. We also show that network effects promote acquisitions over entry and that the … entrepreneur has strong incentives to invest in the initial user base of the innovation. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083667

Task Scheduling and Moral Hazard

Mylovanov, Tymofiy; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

We study a two-period moral hazard problem with risk-neutral and wealth-constrained agents and three identical tasks. We show that the allocation of tasks over time is important if there is a capacity constraint on the number of tasks that can be performed in one period. We characterize the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067477

Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions

Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

This paper discusses the optimal organization of sequential agency problems with contractible control actions under limited liability. In each of two stages, a risk-neutral agent can choose an unobservable effort level. A success in the first stage makes effort in the second stage more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791951