The International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management is sponsored by the Chinese Industrial Engineering Institution, CMES, which is the only national-level academic society for Industrial Engineering. The conference is held annually as the major event in this arena....

The International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management is sponsored by the Chinese Industrial Engineering Institution, CMES, which is the only national-level academic society for Industrial Engineering. The conference is held annually as the major event in this arena....

The International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management is sponsored by the Chinese Industrial Engineering Institution, CMES, which is the only national-level academic society for Industrial Engineering. The conference is held annually as the major event in this arena....

We study a two-period moral hazard problem with risk-neutral and wealth-constrained agents and three identical tasks. We show that the allocation of tasks over time is important if there is a capacity constraint on the number of tasks that can be performed in one period. We characterize the...

We explore the dynamic evolution of property rights regimes in R&D alliances using the incomplete contract approach pioneered by Grossman, Hart and Moore (Hart and Moore, Journal of Political Economy (1990), and Grossman and Hart, Journal of Political Economy (1986)). In contrast to the standard...

This paper discusses the optimal organization of sequential agency problems with contractible control actions under limited liability. In each of two stages, a risk-neutral agent can choose an unobservable effort level. A success in the first stage makes effort in the second stage more...