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The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability

Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

An inventor can invest research effort to come up with an innovation. Once an innovation is made, a contract is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084016

And the Winner Is--Acquired: Entrepreneurship as a Contest with Acquisition as the Prize

Henkel, Joachim; Rønde, Thomas; Wagner, Marcus - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

paper, we analyze a two-stage innovation game between one incumbent and a large number of entrants. In the first stage … innovation. In the second stage, successful entrants bid to be acquired by the incumbent. We assume that entrants cannot survive …&D approaches than the incumbent and are more likely to generate the highest value innovation. Thus, the need of entrants to be …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008784763

Exclusive versus Non-exclusive Licensing Strategies and Moral Hazard

Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

An upstream firm can license its innovation to downstream firms that have to exert further development effort. There …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497972

Trade Secret Laws, Labour Mobility and Innovations

Motta, Massimo; Rønde, Thomas - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

We show that when the researcher’s (observable but not contractible) contribution to innovation is crucial, a covenant …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504700

Task Scheduling and Moral Hazard

Mylovanov, Tymofiy; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

We study a two-period moral hazard problem with risk-neutral and wealth-constrained agents and three identical tasks. We show that the allocation of tasks over time is important if there is a capacity constraint on the number of tasks that can be performed in one period. We characterize the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067477

Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions

Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

This paper discusses the optimal organization of sequential agency problems with contractible control actions under limited liability. In each of two stages, a risk-neutral agent can choose an unobservable effort level. A success in the first stage makes effort in the second stage more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791951

Market and Technical Risk in R&D

Gerlach, Heiko A.; Rønde, Thomas; Stahl, Konrad - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

We endogenize the market risk (at given technical risk) in firms’ R&D decisions by introducing stochastic R&D in the Hotelling model. It is shown that if the technical risk is sufficiently high, the market risk remains low even if firms pursue similar projects. This leads firms to focus on the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504272

Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights in Dynamic R&D Alliances

Rosenkranz, Stephanie; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

We explore the dynamic evolution of property rights regimes in R&D alliances using the incomplete contract approach pioneered by Grossman, Hart and Moore (Hart and Moore, Journal of Political Economy (1990), and Grossman and Hart, Journal of Political Economy (1986)). In contrast to the standard...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067424

Labour Pooling in R&D Intensive Industries

Gerlach, Heiko A.; Rønde, Thomas; Stahl, Konrad - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

more likely in situations where the innovation step is large and the probability for a firm to be the only innovator is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067450

High-Tech Clusters, Technology Spillovers and Trade Secret Laws

Fosfuri, Andrea; Rønde, Thomas - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

simple model of cumulative innovation is presented where technology spillovers arise endogenously through labour mobility. It … to develop an innovation is neither very high nor very low. Trade secret protection based on punitive damages is, except …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666513