We examine a Stackelberg game where a financially constrainedleader faces competition from a ‘deep pocket’ follower. We analyzethe consequences of this trade-off between a financial and a strategicadvantage for both the design of financial contracts and market structure.We derive conditions...

We analyse the effect of concealing limit order traders’ identities on market liquidity. We develop a model in which limit order traders have asymmetric information on the cost of limit order trading (which is determined by the exposure to informed trading). A thin limit order book signals to...

This Paper studies the formation of opening prices for German and French stocks, simultaneously traded in Frankfurt and Paris. We analyse theoretically the case where investors and traders based in the same country as the firm have better information on its value than foreign traders. Our model...

This paper provides a game theoretic model of price formation and order placement decisions in a dynamic limit order market. Investors can choose to post limit orders or to submit market orders. Limit orders result in better execution prices but face a risk of non-execution and a winner’s...

In many security markets, dealers trade with their regular clients at a discount relative to prevailing bid and ask quotes. In this article we provide an explanation to this phenomenon. We consider a dealer and an investor engaged in a long-term relationship. The dealer assigns a reputational...